The Meaning of \u3cem\u3eSex\u3c/em\u3e:  Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and Original Public Meaning by Eskridge, William N., Jr. et al.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 119 Issue 7 
2021 
The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and 
Original Public Meaning 
William N. Eskridge Jr. 
Yale Law School 
Brian G. Slocum 
McGeorge School of Law 
Stefan Th. Gries 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Society Commons, Sexuality and the 
Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Brian G. Slocum & Stefan T. Gries, The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel 
Applications, and Original Public Meaning, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1503 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol119/iss7/3 
https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.7.meaning 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1503
THE MEANING OF SEX:
DYNAMIC WORDS, NOVEL APPLICATIONS, AND
ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
William N . Eskridge Jr .*
Brian G . Slocum**
Stefan Th . Gries†
The meaning of sex matters . The interpretive methodology by which the
meaning of sex is determined matters . Both of these were at issue in the Su-
preme Court’s recent landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,
where the Court held that Title VII protects lesbians, gay men, transgender
persons, and other sexual and gender minorities against workplace discrimi-
nation . Despite unanimously agreeing that Title VII should be interpreted in
accordance with its original public meaning in 1964, the opinions in Bostock
failed to properly define sex or offer a coherent theory of how long-standing
statutes like Title VII should be interpreted over time . We argue that long-
standing statutes are inherently dynamic because they inevitably evolve be-
yond the original legislative expectations, and we offer a new theory and
framework for how courts can manage societal and linguistic evolution . The
framework depends in part on courts defining ‘meaning’ properly so that
statutory coverage is allowed to evolve naturally over time due to changes in
society, even if the meaning of the statutory language is held constant (via
originalism) .
Originalism in statutory and constitutional interpretation typically focuses
on the language of the text itself and whether it has evolved over time (what
we term linguistic dynamism), but courts should also recognize that the fea-
tures of the objects of interpretation may also evolve over time (what we term
societal dynamism) . As society changes, so do social norms; what we call
normative dynamism is the influence of evolving values on the interpretive
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
** Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law.
† Professor of Linguistics, University of California, Santa Barbara. We appreciate
helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article from workshops at the law schools of
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and Yale University. We are particularly indebted to Aaron Bruhl, Bridget Fahey, Daniel Far-
ber, Jonah Gelbach, Mark Gergen, Jonathan Gould, Abbe Gluck, David Grewal, Orin Kerr,
Aziz Huq, Shlomo Klapper, Genevieve Lakier, Thomas Lee, Kristin Luker, Richard McAdams,
Peter Menell, Frank Partnoy, Dylan Penningroth, Farah Peterson, Russell Robinson, Jonathan
Simon, Lawrence Solan, Geoffrey Stone, and Kevin Tobia for useful suggestions and com-
ments.
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enterprise, however conceptualized . Linguistic and normative dynamism cre-
ate difficulties for originalism, but societal dynamism should not, as original-
ists have assumed in other contexts (such as Second Amendment
jurisprudence) . We explore the relationship among societal, linguistic, and
normative dynamism and their implications for original public meaning .
Putting our framework into action, we demonstrate, through the application
of corpus analysis and linguistic theory, that sex in 1964 was not limited to
“biological distinctions between male and female,” as all the opinions in Bos-
tock assumed, and that gender and sexual orientation were essentially non-
words in 1964 . Sex thus had a broader meaning than it does today, where
terms like gender and sexual orientation (and other terms like sexuality) de-
note concepts that once could be referred to as sex (on its own and in com-
pounds) . In turn, today’s gays and lesbians and transgender people are social
groups that did not exist (or that existed in a very different form) in 1964 . By
limiting the meaning of sex to “biological distinctions” and failing to recog-
nize that societal dynamism can change statutory coverage, the Court missed
the opportunity to explicitly affirm that the societal evolution of gays and les-
bians and transgender people has legal significance . Finally, the Court missed
an opportunity to acknowledge the importance law can assume in societal
and linguistic dynamism: one reason gays and lesbians are a novel social
group is that they live in a world where same-sex intimacy is not a crime and
the state does not treat homosexuality as psychopathic .
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On June 15, 2020, the Roberts Court set off a minor public law explosion
when it handed down its decision in Bostock v . Clayton County.1 The big
news was that lesbians, gay men, transgender persons, and other sexual and
gender minorities are protected against workplace discrimination under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In less than twenty years, these mi-
norities have moved from being outlaws and psychopaths to in-laws with
jobs.3 For professors of legislation, history, and linguistics, the headline was
that all three opinions in the case—the majority opinion for the 6–3 Court
and both dissenting opinions—billed themselves as determining the original
1. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
2 . See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
3 . See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & CHRISTOPHER R. RIANO, MARRIAGE EQUALITY:
FROM OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS (2020).
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public meaning4 of Title VII’s text, which from 1964 through the present has
told employers they cannot “discriminate against any individual . . . because
of such individual’s . . . sex.”5 But how do you get from this language focus-
ing on sex to protection of the two gay men and one transgender woman in-
volved in the cases consolidated in Bostock? This was surely beyond the
imagination or even the tolerance of legislators in 1964.
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court focused on the definitions of the
key statutory terms—including sex, which he explicitly assumed meant only
the biological differences between women and men—and concluded that a
man fired for dating men would not have been fired if he were a woman who
dated men, and a person identified as male at birth but who now identifies as
female would not have been fired had they been identified as female at
birth.6 Thus, the original public meaning of Title VII covered gay and
transgender employees. Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito’s dissenting
opinion framed the public meaning inquiry as an empirical issue: no one
reading the statutory language in 1964 would have thought it protected “gays
and lesbians” or “transgender persons,” who were considered immoral,
criminal, or, at best, “mental[ly] disorder[ed]” in that period.7 Rather, “[t]he
possibility that discrimination on either of these grounds might fit within
some exotic understanding of sex discrimination would not have crossed
the[] minds” of “ordinary Americans.”8 In fact, “Americans . . . would have
been shocked to learn” that Title VII forbids “discrimination on the basis of
‘transgender status’ or ‘gender identity,’ ” which are “terms that would have
left people [in 1964] scratching their heads.”9 Justice Kavanaugh’s dissenting
opinion similarly argued that the Court’s opinion “rewrites history” by refus-
ing to acknowledge that “an overwhelming body of federal
law . . . demonstrates that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from,
and not a form of, sex discrimination.”10
While the justices disagreed about how the public meaning of a legal text
should be framed, and what evidence is relevant to its determination, the
Bostock Court was unanimous in maintaining that the meanings of all the
4. In this Article, we use double quotes for quotations, single quotes for meanings and
concepts, and italics for mentions of words (and for emphasis), as exemplified in the following
sentence: The public meaning of run is ‘to go faster than a walk.’
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Another relevant
provision, § 703(m), was added to Title VII in its 1991 Amendments. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. 102–166, sec. 107, § 703(m), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2).
6 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741–42.
7 . Id . at 1769–73, 1777 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003, at 387–407 (2008) (docu-
menting factual points made in this part of the Alito dissent).
8 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting).
9 . Id . at 1772 (explaining that “transgender” and “gender identity” were not in “com-
mon parlance” in the 1960s).
10 . Id . at 1828–29 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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relevant terms—“discriminate,” “because of,” “individual,” and “sex”—were
the same in 2021 as in 1964. Indeed, the notion of “updating” Title VII was
anathema to all the justices. One major theme of both dissenting opinions
was that the Court was updating Title VII to reflect the current values of so-
ciety while disingenuously claiming to apply textualist principles,11 which
the Court sternly denied.12 The thesis of this Article is that the Bostock
Court—majority and dissenters alike—overstated the dichotomy between
original public meaning and dynamic interpretation.13
As we explain in Part I, because super-statutes like Title VII are both
transformative and long-standing, interpretive uncertainties arise when they
are applied to new, and often unforeseen, circumstances.14 An original-
public-meaning interpreter will also be a dynamic interpreter (even if un-
consciously) because statutes must be applied to scenarios that did not exist
(and often could not have been imagined) at the time of the statute’s crea-
tion. In addition, the objects or concepts to which the statute is applied, ra-
ther than the statutory language itself, may also evolve over time. Situations
like the two described above—where applying the statute today has different
outcomes than applying it when it was enacted, even when the original
meaning of the statutory language is unchanged—are examples of what we
term societal dynamism. Significantly, these scenarios are distinct from cir-
cumstances where the meanings of the statutory words themselves evolve
over time, as natural language often does. We label this situation linguistic
dynamism and argue that it is as inevitable as the earlier scenarios. Finally,
because changes in society and law over time produce new social and even
11 . Id . at 1756 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should “own up to what it is
doing,” which is “represent[ing] . . . a theory of statutory interpretation that Justice Scalia exco-
riated—the theory that courts should ‘update’ old statutes so that they better reflect the current
values of society”); id . at 1834 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court updated Title
VII by “seizing on literal meaning and overlooking the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘dis-
criminate because of sex.’ ” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1))).
12 . Id . at 1738 (majority opinion) (explaining that “[i]f judges could . . . update . . . old
statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk
amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives”).
13. For a similar project in the context of the Founding and the early Republic, see
Farah Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, 130 YALE L.J. 2 (2020).
14. Super-statutes are landmark laws that successfully displace common law norms and
entrench new transformational legal rules. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-
Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1230–46 (2001). Most leading scholars believe such statutes ought
to be applied dynamically to carry forth their purposes into modern society. See, e .g .,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 81–88 (1921); JOHN CHIPMAN
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 170–83 (Roland Gray ed., Macmillan 1921)
(1909); HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111−1210 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION (2013);
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). Experience suggests that whatever the inter-
pretive theory, these long-standing statutes will inevitably be applied dynamically over time.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48–49 (1994).
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constitutional norms, the application of old statutes to current circumstanc-
es often implicates what we label normative dynamism. Linguistic and nor-
mative dynamism challenge originalism in ways that societal dynamism does
not.
In Part II, we address these three scenarios through analysis of a varia-
tion of a famous hypothetical discussed in Bostock, an ordinance we shall
(for narrative convenience) situate in 1964: “No vehicles shall be allowed in
the park.”15 Society since 1964 has evolved in various ways, including tech-
nologically. This evolution creates potential interpretive disputes about
whether the ordinance applies to mechanisms (such as Segways) that exist in
2021 but did not in 1964.16 As a matter of language as well as legal logic, a
directive using words whose meaning is stable over time is therefore moder-
ately dynamic: it will often apply beyond the expectations of its framers.17
Similarly, capturing the second type of societal evolution, the no-vehicles
prohibition may apply to mechanisms that did exist but may not have been
covered in 1964, if those mechanisms have fundamentally changed since
1964.18 An example might be new motorized wheelchairs that are much big-
ger, faster, and more sophisticated than those existing in 1964. Application
of the earlier law to something that changed so dramatically might often be a
fairly uncontroversial example of statutory updating, beyond but not neces-
sarily against the original expectations or meaning.
The two scenarios above demonstrate the dynamic potential of statutory
provisions even without implicating situations where the meanings of the
statutory terms have changed over time. But language is dynamic. Words
may mean today something quite different than in some earlier period.19 For
15 . See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).
16 . See infra Section II.B. (analyzing how the no-vehicles statute should be applied to
objects that did not exist at the time of the statute’s enactment).
17 . See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 282–83, 287–92 (1989); cf . William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 319, 324 (1989) (arguing that the “faithful agent” of an open-textured statute will ap-
ply it both beyond and against original legislative expectations).
18 . See infra Section II.C. (analyzing how the no-vehicles statute should be applied to
objects whose features have changed over time).
19 . See JOHN R. TAYLOR, LINGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION 59−60 (3d ed. 2003) (“[T]he
prototype representations of many categories may change dramatically over time. Speakers in
1800, 1900, and 2000 would surely have selected different entities as good examples of the ve-
hicle category, while the prototypical automobiles of eighty years ago are now fairly marginal
exemplars of the category.”); see also JEAN AITCHISON, LANGUAGE CHANGE: PROGRESS OR
DECAY? 153–54 (Cambridge Univ. Press 4th ed. 2013) (1981) (explaining that “sociolinguistic
causes of language change” involve the altering of language “as the needs of its users alter”);
PETER LUDLOW, LIVING WORDS: MEANING UNDERDETERMINATION AND THE DYNAMIC
LEXICON 3 (2014) (rejecting “the idea that words are relatively stable things with fixed mean-
ings”); DIRK GEERAERTS, THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 230 (2010) (“[N]ew word senses
emerge in the context of actual language use.”).
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instance, because so many new motorized conveyances have come on the
market since 1964, the meaning of vehicle itself has evolved, evidencing lin-
guistic dynamism.20 In some of these situations, such as criminal laws where
the audience for the statute is itself evolving, compelling reasons may exist
for insisting that the statutory language means something different in 2021
than in 1964.21 A similar phenomenon occurs when the application of old
statutes is in tension with new social or constitutional norms. In such situa-
tions, the judicial process of accommodating new norms, and thereby pro-
ducing a dynamic interpretation, is typically unconscious or implicit,
although there are no compelling reasons why it must be.22
What is our evidence for these assertions? We document our language-
based claims with empirical evidence that is vastly superior to the usual dic-
tionary shopping and personal-intuition methods ordinarily deployed by
judges. Specifically, we use corpus linguistics to help demonstrate how
changes to language and society over time combine to make statutory mean-
ing inevitably dynamic. Corpus linguistics is typically based on “the statisti-
cal analysis of data from a corpus,” which is “a [machine-readable]
compilation of written and transcribed spoken language used in authentic
communicative contexts” (such as in newspapers, novels, books, etc.).23 If
performed competently, corpus linguistics meets the scientific standards of
generalizability, reliability, and validity.24 Recently, various academics and
judges have argued that corpus linguistics can help judges approach public
meaning in a more systematic and objective manner.25 While some of the
leading approaches to corpus linguistics in the legal context have serious
shortcomings, as we address, corpus linguistics does have the potential to
help judges make better, empirically based judgments about how words are
used, both today and historically.
Through the application of linguistic theory, we offer three important
contributions to a better understanding of the significance of the Court’s
20 . See infra Section II.E. (describing how the term vehicle has evolved since 1964).
21 . See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57
(1998) (discussing dynamic interpretation in relation to criminal statutes).
22 . See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
609 (1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation is, in the deepest cases, an occasion for the
interpreter to interact with the text and everything coming after the text).
23. Brief for Amici Curiae Corpus-Linguistics Scholars Professors Brian Slocum, Stefan
Th. Gries & Lawrence Solan in Support of Emps. at 7, Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020) (No. 17-1618).
24. Haoshan Ren, Margaret Wood, Clark D. Cunningham, Noor Abbady, Ute Römer,
Heather Kuhn & Jesse Egbert, “Questions Involving National Peace and Harmony” or “Injured
Plaintiff Litigation”? The Original Meaning of “Cases” in Article III of the Constitution, 36 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 535, 540 (2020) (explaining the scientific nature of corpus linguistics).
25 . See, e .g ., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127
YALE L.J. 788 (2018) (arguing that corpus linguistics can make legal interpretation more em-
pirical).
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movement toward emphasizing original public meaning when interpreting
statutes. To begin with, as explained in Part I, Bostock illustrates how statu-
tory interpretation in federal courts has shifted focus away from language
production to language comprehension. Given the Court’s movement to-
ward original public meaning, there is now less focus on legislators’ expecta-
tions when drafting statutes and more on the understanding and
expectations of the public expected to comprehend statutory directives. This
is a more important shift than scholars and courts have recognized. Descrip-
tively, the shift demands that judges improve their skills at interpreting texts,
and that has created a legal as well as a judicial audience for expert historical
analysis and linguistic theory (hence, this Article). The interpretive shift
from language production to language consumption has also diminished the
importance of congressional deliberation and has marginalized knowledge
about the legislative process and how to research legislative history, which
have been traditional legal skills since the New Deal.26 Normatively, the shift
is away from legitimacy based on representative democracy and good gov-
ernance and toward legitimacy based on a neutral rule of law. The judicial
debate in Bostock reflects the Roberts Court’s ongoing efforts to exhibit ex-
pertise and neutrality in its application of textual materials to new facts and
legal controversies.27 The critical analysis in this Article suggests that the
Court faces major difficulties when the justices try to identify original public
meaning: they do not reveal impressive expertise in language analysis, and
the cherry-picked and closeted norms of their historical analyses undermine
their aspirations toward neutrality.
A second contribution of our Article, also developed in Part I, is a theo-
retical grounding for the Gorsuch versus Alito/Thomas/Kavanaugh debate
over precisely what original public meaning entails.28 Justice Gorsuch takes
what linguists might call a more ‘intensional’ approach to meaning, which
determines the general concept defining the relevant statutory term and ap-
plies it to the objects in question (in Bostock, lesbians, gay men, transgender
persons, and other sexual and gender minorities). In contrast, the dissenting
opinions take a more ‘extensional’ approach to meaning, which asks what
things fall within the statutory category at a certain point in time.29 Thus,
Gorsuch applies the concepts entailed in discriminate and because of and sex
to modern gay men, lesbians, and transgender persons—while Alito and Ka-
26. As this Article partially demonstrates, it appears judges are currently not as good at
historical and language analysis as they once were with legislative history analysis (which was
uneven at best). See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
27. Expertise and neutrality in application at least seem to be the central agenda of Neil
Gorsuch and John Roberts, two unexpected votes for LGBT rights.
28. For all the justices, the reference point is 1964, which is a mistake considering that
Title VII has been amended multiple times. See infra Section III.C.2.
29. See infra Section I.B.1 (explaining the distinction between extensional and inten-
sional meaning).
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vanaugh insist that the (empirically based) inquiry must be whether gays and
lesbians would have been listed under the ‘sex’ concept in Title VII in 1964.
This may be a long-term division within the Court—Gorsuch and Roberts
versus Alito, Thomas, and Kavanaugh, with the Court’s more liberal prag-
matists still looking at legislative history and purpose.30 Regardless of the
methodological division within the Court, we argue that only an intensional
approach to statutory meaning can coherently account for change over time.
Indeed, we maintain that the dissenters’ only originalist argument that was
not beset by anachronism would have rested upon an intensional approach
that understood the meaning of sex in light of natural law norms widely
shared in 1964.
Our third contribution is a demonstration in Parts II and III of the reali-
ty of dynamic interpretation even when jurists are trying to apply an origi-
nal-public-meaning approach. The no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical
illustrates our theory of dynamic meaning, but our main objective is to shed
light on super-statutes like Title VII. The insights are straightforward, even if
judicially unrecognized, and start with an understanding of societal dyna-
mism. If you apply a stable public meaning to ever-evolving social facts, po-
litical and economic contexts, and even groups of people, the statute will
evolve beyond the original expectations.31 In fact, even Justices Alito and
Thomas would not apply extensional meaning without some accommoda-
tion of new things in the world or old things that change. Their mentor Jus-
tice Scalia (cited numerous times in Bostock) certainly did not, nor have
Thomas and Alito done so in the context of the Second Amendment’s pro-
tection of the right to “keep and bear arms,” which they (like Scalia) apply to
modern (fire)arms.32 If new weapons are protected under a 1791 constitu-
tional provision, why cannot a new or changed social class be protected un-
der a 1964 statute? What the justices did not appreciate is that in the fifty
years after the enactment of Title VII there came to be things in the world
(what Alito calls “gays and lesbians”)33 that, in the eyes of society, did not ex-
ist in 1964 or have radically changed. As we shall demonstrate, the justices
would have been tipped off if they had looked beyond dictionary definitions
or if their intense search into dictionaries of the 1960s had been more thor-
ough.34
30. Cf . Stuart Minor Benjamin & Kristen M. Renberg, The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s
Campaign Against Legislative History, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2020) (showing empir-
ically that textualist critiques of legislative history have had the effect of causing some judges
“to (re)examine their treatment of legislative history but not . . . to avoid citing it”).
31 . See Farber, supra note 17, at 287–93; infra Part III (arguing that even an original-
public-meaning approach to the interpretation of Title VII must recognize that the application
of the statute will change over time).
32 . See infra notes 157–158 and accompanying text.
33. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct 1731, 1769 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
34 . Id . at 1784–89 (reporting definitions of sex in the leading dictionaries of the 1960s);
see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 362–63 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Sykes,
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A deeper problem besets all three Bostock opinions. As we establish via
corpus analysis in Part III, the public meaning of the term sex in 1964 cannot
be limited to ‘biological distinctions between male and female.’ Sex had a
broader, more catch-all meaning than it usually does today, where terms like
gender and sexual orientation (and other terms like sexuality) denote con-
cepts that once could be referred to as sex (on its own and in compounds).
Thus, all three Bostock opinions appeared oblivious to linguistic dynamism:
none of the opinions acknowledged how pervasively and deeply the regula-
tory term sex had changed in the last half century. Yet, as we demonstrate,
that is precisely what happened. Indeed, the regulatory term evolved both
descriptively and normatively: the broad and undifferentiated term sex gave
way to the meteoric rise of gender as a way of talking about social roles for
men and women that were not driven by biology. This twin evolution of lan-
guage and norms describes and justifies the arc of EEOC and Supreme Court
precedents interpreting Title VII’s sex-discrimination bar to an expanding
array of gendered decisionmaking by employers. Indeed, it explains the sub-
tle shifts in rhetoric of Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court: he starts with
‘sex as biology,’ having stipulated to the narrow meaning of sex, but early in
the opinion starts writing about ‘sex as gender’ as though they were part of
the same concept—which they were, in the 1960s.35 As the dissenters vaguely
perceived, Gorsuch was deploying ‘sex as gender’ normatively, reflecting the
understanding held by the EEOC and the Court that the project of Title VII
was to police employer insistence on traditional gender roles.36
Among our other contributions, we thus hope to demonstrate that even
an understanding of statutory interpretation that focuses exclusively on the
ordinary meaning of words cannot be viewed as merely the delivery of the
public meaning that would have been found at the time of enactment.37 Orig-
inal public meaning requires a deep understanding of history that is hard for
generalist judges to master and may be an uphill struggle even for historians.
As Geoffrey Hawthorn has observed, “even if one manages to play old music
on old instruments, one cannot hear it with old ears.”38 The music of old
J., dissenting) (insisting that sex was limited to biological difference between men and women
but citing only three dictionaries cherry-picked to that effect).
35 . Compare Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (proceeding under the assumption that sex re-
fers “only to biological distinctions between male and female”), with id . at 1741 (describing
examples of sex discrimination in which a woman is fired because she is “insufficiently femi-
nine” and a man is fired because he is “insufficiently masculine”).
36 . Id . at 1761 (Alito, J., dissenting).
37. Of course, such an understanding is also implausible given our legal culture’s com-
mitment to stare decisis, respect for legislative deliberations, deference to agency views, and
substantive canons such as the canon of constitutional avoidance.
38. GEOFFREY HAWTHORN, ENLIGHTENMENT AND DESPAIR: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
THEORY, at ix (2d ed. 1987) (paraphrasing BERNARD WILLIAMS, DESCARTES: THE PROJECT OF
PURE ENQUIRY, at xiii (Routledge 2005) (1978)). We are indebted to Kristin Luker for this ref-
erence.
May 2021] The Meaning of Sex 1513
statutes will be heard by interpreters who cannot entirely escape their own
social and normative frames.
Within the foregoing limitations, we make a modest suggestion. The
rhetoric of original public meaning is an opportunity for judges to explore
approaches to statutory text that require them to think about language more
systematically and objectively. If the linguistic meaning of a statute is to be
privileged, judges should embrace knowledge and insights from linguistics
and philosophy of language, rather than dictionary definitions and ad hoc
linguistic judgments. Doing so would help judges escape their own linguistic
idiosyncrasies and substantive biases and apply text in ways that are more
genuinely neutral.39 In this way, judicial interpretations that conceal evolu-
tive judgments or ideological biases behind poor textual, linguistic, and his-
torical analyses can be brought out of the closet and evaluated for what they
are—dynamic through and through, but in ways that fail to comport with
how language functions. We add a less modest suggestion for originalist
judges: please be aware that you are filtering old language through your own
linguistic and normative lenses. Your role as a neutral arbiter requires you to
internalize the linguistic and normative lenses that the broader society, and
not just your social or political cohort, has come to accept.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY
It is remarkable that the biggest statutory-interpretation case of the
Court’s 2019 Term contained no great debates between textualist and prag-
matic justices, as there often were during Justice Scalia’s tenure.40 But there
was a great debate among the three opinions, all of which claimed the mantle
of Justice Scalia, textualism, and original public meaning. In varying degrees,
the three opinions in Bostock address language issues raised by original-
public-meaning theory, such as (1) the interpretive question posed by the
public-meaning standard, (2) the linguistic and other context relevant to the
interpretation of the statutory phrase at issue, and (3) temporal issues in-
volving how the passage of time affects the meaning of the text. Our main
objective is to address the fundamental flaw in all three opinions: their rejec-
tion of the proposition that a statute is a dynamic entity and societal, norma-
tive, and linguistic evolution might cause its application to change over time.
We focus on the third category of issues, but the three categories are interre-
39 . See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 62 (1993) (“[J]udges do not
make good linguists because they are using linguistic principles to accomplish an agenda dis-
tinct from the principles about which they write.”).
40 . See, e .g ., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). This case is a proto-
typical example of such Scalia-era debates. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, interpreted the
phrase “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to have a plain meaning that did not allow for the recovery
of expert fees, id . at 88, which Justice Stevens rejected as a “literal approach” inconsistent with
the “congressional purpose,” id . at 112–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lated, and our insights also address issues involving the framing of public
meaning and the evidence relevant to its determination.
Determining the original public meaning of a text is a notoriously diffi-
cult endeavor. Judges have struggled to establish public meaning through
historical analysis, consultation of dictionaries, searches of newspaper and
academic articles, as well as unsupported assertions about what the public, or
some reasonable person, would have believed about the meaning of the text
at the time of enactment.41 Today, there are various corpora, or databases of
public texts, that can be searched for particular terms and some context. To
utilize these databases effectively, the interpreter must channel the linguistic
evidence into an organizing conceptual framework that represents valid lin-
guistic choices.42 A coherent conceptual framework is crucial because com-
plex temporal aspects of meaning are implicated when the statutory
application arises decades after the law was enacted. Bostock illustrates both
the undertheorized judicial approach to the temporal aspects of interpreta-
tion and the difficulties of applying any interpretive theory to a statute en-
acted long ago. Every opinion considered the statutory text critically im-
important and insisted that it yielded one unambiguous meaning. Yet the six
majority justices endorsed a plain meaning rejected by the three dissenting
justices, and none of the opinions offered an adequate theory of language in
accomplishing the task of applying that text to a new problem. In fact, be-
cause all the justices conceded or acquiesced in the view that Title VII has an
unchanging public meaning, no particular legal relevance was given to
whether the ‘objects’ of that meaning (‘gays and lesbians’ and ‘transgender
persons’) or their constitutional status had changed over time.43 As we shall
see in Part III, all three opinions in Bostock assumed a static society and con-
stitutional regime.
In this Part, we address crucial theoretical issues surrounding the under-
standing and application of original public meaning from the perspective of
linguistic theory. We start with what is ‘public’ about public meaning, then
address the concept of public ‘meaning,’ and finally explain how none of the
41. One problem with speculating about how some ‘reasonable person’ (or community)
would have understood the meaning of a specific provision at the time of enactment is that
there is no way of directly measuring that (hypothetical) understanding and the interpreter
may, even if unintentionally, substitute her understanding for that of the reasonable person.
See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, Essay, False Consensus Bias in Con-
tract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1268–69 (2008) (explaining the concept of “false
consensus bias,” which describes the propensity to believe that one’s views about meaning are
the predominant views).
42 . See Mark C. Suchman, The Power of Words: A Comment on Hamann and Vogel’s
Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal Linguistics—Unlikely Blends Made in Germany,
2017 BYU L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2017) (“[T]o transmute a collection of empirical observations
into a body of empirical knowledge requires both an organizing conceptual framework and a
purposeful investment in synthesis.”).
43 . See supra notes 10−11 and accompanying text.
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opinions in Bostock described a persuasive version of the ‘public meaning’
concept.44 The discussion is intended to provide an understanding of how
temporal issues involving the passage of time affect the meaning of legal
texts. The potential for term and object meanings to change over time cre-
ates various combinations of language evolution that present distinct issues
for legal interpreters. Sometimes this evolution reflects societal dynamism
rather than language change, which can nevertheless require changes in how
a statute is applied.45 At other times, linguistic dynamism occurs when the
meaning of the statutory language itself has evolved over time.46 To illustrate
how both societal and linguistic dynamism can result in statutory dynamism,
we shall consider the following three scenarios:
(1) the meaning of a statutory term is deemed to be fixed at enact-
ment, in accordance with an originalist view of interpretation, but
the object of interpretation did not exist at the time of statutory en-
actment;
(2) the meaning of a statutory term is deemed to be fixed at enact-
ment, in accordance with an originalist view of interpretation, and
the object of interpretation did exist at the time of statutory enact-
ment, but its features have significantly changed; and
(3) the meaning of a statutory term has changed over time.
The first two scenarios involve societal dynamism; the third, linguistic
dynamism. We discuss the three scenarios in this Part and then illustrate
them via the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical in Part II. As we explain
below, the third scenario is at odds with most originalist theories, but
originalists sometimes accept the first two.
44. We save our criticisms of the Court’s opinion until Part III, infra.
45. We thus distinguish between situations where a court recognizes the changed mean-
ing of some word or phrase in a statute and situations where the court applies the original
meaning to some new or changed object or concept. There is debate within the philosophical
literature about whether the application of a statute to an object or concept changes the mean-
ing of the statute. See generally ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY (Hart
Publ’g rev. 2d ed. 2005) (1992) (discussing the constructive model of interpretation and the
semantic natural law theory of interpretation). Certainly, some applications of a statute change
the statute’s meaning, such as ones where the court must precisify the statutory language in
order to apply the statute. BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 6 (2015). Nevertheless, we refer in this
Article to a narrower notion of ‘meaning’ that is synonymous with the linguistic meaning of a
statute’s terms.
46. Of course, both societal and linguistic dynamism might occur simultaneously, as is
the case with Title VII. See infra Part III. In Part II, we explore the importance of normative
dynamism. See infra Part II.
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A. Framing the ‘Public’ of Original Public Meaning
Legal interpretation generally seeks to measure the beliefs or actions of
some particular class of people. Sweeping broadly, courts sometimes focus
on the language production of the legislature and at other times on language
comprehension, typically of the ordinary person or interpretive community.47
Notwithstanding differing interpretive perspectives, most judges today agree
that, to some degree at least, language comprehension should be priori-
tized.48 That is, courts presume that language in legal texts should be given
its ordinary meaning, determined by general principles of language usage
that apply outside the law.49 The ordinary-meaning standard is justified in
part on the basis that it is consistent with fundamental principles of legal in-
terpretation, such as the notions that the public should be able to read and
understand legal texts and that the law should be predictable and objective in
its application.50 But do judges trained in the doctrines and language of law
and drawn from an unrepresentative slice of society have a comparative ad-
vantage in figuring out how ordinary people would understand statutory
language?
1. The Basic Concept of ‘Ordinary Meaning’
The ordinary-meaning concept typically focuses on how an average
reader—the typical member of the public—would understand the relevant
47. Judge Frank Easterbrook, for example, believes that “the significance of an expres-
sion depends on how the interpretive community alive at the time of the text’s adoption under-
stood those words.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, at xxv (2012). See also Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 289–96 (2019)
(describing how intentionalists and textualists frame the objective of interpretation).
48 . E .g ., Harvard L. Sch., The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan
on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 08:29 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (“We are all textualists now.”).
49. See SLOCUM, supra note 45, at 3 (“[C]ourts typically seek to determine the ordinary
meaning of legal texts when deciding cases.”); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 576–77 (2008) (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Consti-
tution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’ ” (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))).
50. See Herman Cappelen, Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues, in CONTEXT-
SENSITIVITY AND SEMANTIC MINIMALISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 3, 19
(Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter eds., 2007) (“When we articulate rules, directives, laws and
other action-guiding instructions, we assume that people, variously situated, can grasp that
content in the same way.”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER
ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 33−55 (2016) (making a normative case
for the key role played by ordinary meaning).
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language, as opposed to the legislature’s intent or purpose in creating it.51 In
that sense, it measures the ‘public’ meaning of the text, as all three opinions
in Bostock recognized.52 Justice Holmes famously opined that the interpret-
er’s role is not to ask what the author meant to convey but instead to deter-
mine “what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of
English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used.”53 By its
very nature, the ‘ordinary’ meaning of a provision must consist of elements
that cut across contexts and are external to the interpreter’s preferences.54
This may sound pretty simple, but distinguishing between the linguistic
meaning of language and subjectively perceived purpose is often difficult;
and, in any case, determining that linguistic meaning is typically not the end
of the interpretive process.
From a linguistic perspective, considerations of context and purpose are
ineliminable aspects of the ordinary meaning determination. With natural-
language understanding, and particularly with legal texts, the goal is to de-
termine what a sentence means in a given context of utterance rather than
just what it could mean in general.55 Thus, in addition to conventions of lan-
guage, an ordinary meaning must be informed by contextual and purposive
evidence, which is sometimes extratextual in nature. For example, in deter-
mining whether a ‘no vehicles’ law prohibits bicycles from the park, the in-
terpreter (like an ordinary person) might consider the perceived purpose of
the law: if it is to cleanse the park of noxious fumes and motor noises, bikes
would be okay—but probably not if it is to make the park safe for the elderly
and small children.56
51. See Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 351–52 (1994) (explaining that textualism seeks objectivity by focusing
on “what the ordinary reader of a statute would have understood the words to mean at the time
of enactment” as opposed to the legislature’s intent in creating the statute). Certain Supreme
Court opinions also focus on the likely interpretation of an ordinary person. See, e .g ., Bond v.
United States, 572 U.S. 844, 861 (2014) (“When used in the manner here, the chemicals in this
case are not of the sort that an ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical
warfare.”).
52 . See James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory In-
terpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 957, 961 (2019) (using “ordinary meaning” and “public meaning”
interchangeably).
53. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
417–18 (1899).
54 . See Brian G. Slocum & Jarrod Wong, The Vienna Convention and the Ordinary
Meaning of International Law, 46 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021).
55 . See ESKRIDGE, supra note 50, at 3–11 (discussing the importance of statutory pur-
pose and other context to interpretation).
56 . See Hart, supra note 15, at 607 (indicating that bicycles may or may not be included
in a no-vehicles law); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 50, at 4–5 (explaining that statutory pur-
pose would determine whether to include bicycles); cf ., e .g ., State v. Barnes, 403 P.3d 72, 73–75
(Wash. 2017) (holding that a riding lawn mower was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning
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Even when it can be ascertained, ordinary meaning often (typically?)
underdetermines the actual interpretations made by even its most ardent ju-
dicial adherents.57 Often, precise binary distinctions are required to resolve
interpretive disputes, which the ordinary meaning of language typically does
not provide, forcing judges to look elsewhere for interpretive resolution.58
Furthermore, it might be clear that the relevant textual language should be
given a special legal or technical meaning, or even some meaning that is not
technical or legal but is seldom used (and thus an unordinary meaning).59
For instance, Justice Alito argued in his Bostock dissent that “discriminate
because of sex” was a term of art used in previous statutes and orders, which
had an accepted legal meaning in 1964.60 In addition, a judge’s understand-
ing of ordinary meaning will be influenced or even controlled by prior deci-
sions; you cannot have a theory of statutory interpretation or legal meaning
without having a theory of precedent.61 All the Bostock opinions made some
effort to justify their interpretations of Title VII as consistent with precedent,
and the Gorsuch opinion secured most of its persuasive power by invoking
the Court’s interpretation of Title VII to reach sexual harassment of working
women, coworkers’ homosexual harassment, and gender stereotyping.62 Fi-
nally, the commonsense, person-on-the-street meaning of the textual lan-
guage may be legally unacceptable for some reason, such as a meaning that
would raise a serious constitutional issue or result in absurdity.63 In such
of a motor-vehicle-theft statute because the statute was enacted to combat the high rate of au-
tomobile theft).
57 . See LUDLOW, supra note 19, at 65 (“The words used by lawmakers are just as open-
ended as words used in day-to-day conversation.”). The extent to which ordinary meaning un-
derdetermines a court’s interpretation depends, obviously, on how broadly ‘ordinary meaning’
is defined. While a very narrow definition of ordinary meaning may be unsatisfactory because
it underdetermines interpretations in every case, an unduly broad definition will lead to inco-
herence because it serves merely as a conclusory label for whatever interpretation a court finds
to be most persuasive.
58 . See Brian G. Slocum, Replacing the Flawed Chevron Standard, 60 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 195, 238−39 (2018) (explaining how legal interpretation’s reliance on bivalency, “the idea
that interpretative questions have ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers,” is in tension with the prototypical
structure of language).
59. Thus, ordinary meaning is defeasible. See, e .g ., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.,
566 U.S. 560, 569 (2012) (“[T]he word ‘interpreter’ can encompass persons who translate doc-
uments, but because that is not the ordinary meaning of the word, it does not control unless
the context in which the word appears indicates that it does.”).
60. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1764−76 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
61 . See ESKRIDGE, supra note 50, at 139−90; MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF
PRECEDENT 97 (2008); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
62 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 17443 (“All that the statute’s plain terms suggest, this Court’s
cases have already confirmed.”).
63. The absurdity doctrine may be the clearest example of a situation where a court has
rejected the meaning of the text (whether communicative or otherwise) in favor of some other
meaning. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2003).
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cases, a court’s interpretation will be based on principles that reflect norma-
tive legal commitments but that arguably reflect neither language production
nor comprehension.64
2. Public Meaning as an Empirical Question or a Linguistic Question
The justices in Bostock might have all agreed on the proper objective of
interpretation, ‘original public meaning,’ but how is the language compre-
hension of the public to be measured? Not a single justice in Bostock offered
direct evidence of whether the average American would have read in 1964,
or would read today, the language of Title VII to protect gay, lesbian, or
transgender employees.65 In fact, the opinions largely ended up talking past
each other because the majority’s conception of public meaning differed
from that of the dissenting opinions. In turn, this divergence led to conflict
regarding which interpretive sources help determine public meaning.66
The reasoning of the Court’s opinion focused on compositional public
meaning. The principle of compositionality states that “the meaning of a
complex linguistic expression is built up from the meanings of its composite
parts in a rule-governed fashion.”67 A sentence is compositional if its mean-
ing is the sum of the meanings of its parts and of the relations of the parts.68
Thus, the Court’s opinion did not focus on perceived public views about the
meaning of Title VII, or gay men, lesbians, and transgender persons. Rather,
the Court addressed the individual meanings of Title VII’s terms, “discrimi-
nation,” “because of,” and “sex,” maintaining that the overall meaning of the
provision would be the sum of its composite parts.69
The avoidance canon is another example where the interpretation chosen by the court might
not conform to the intended meaning of the statute or the meaning an ordinary reader would
give it. See Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1275, 1275 (2016).
64 . See Fish, supra note 63.
65 . Cf . Macleod, supra note 52 (analyzing how an ordinary reader would understand
Title VII’s language by asking ordinary readers to apply that language in context, drawing on a
set of nationally representative survey experiments); Shlomo Klapper, Soren Schmidt & Tor
Tarantola, Ordinary Meaning from Ordinary People, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(using surveys to measure how ordinary people apply statutes to specific interpretive disputes).
66 . See SLOCUM, supra note 45, at 36−37 (describing the constituent and evidential
questions of statutory interpretation).
67. M. LYNNE MURPHY & ANU KOSKELA, KEY TERMS IN SEMANTICS 36 (2010).
68 . See id . Describing “compositionality” in a general sense is sufficient for our purpos-
es, although different versions of the concept are stronger or weaker and can take more or less
context into account. See ZOLTÁN GENDLER SZABÓ & RICHMOND H. THOMASON, PHILOSOPHY
OF LANGUAGE 58 (2019) (describing various forms of compositionality, including “weak com-
positionality (with context)”).
69. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020).
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Justice Kavanaugh responded, in dissent, that the Court was focusing on
“literal meaning rather than ordinary meaning.”70 He introduced phrases
such as “American flag,” “cold war,” and “washing machine,” which have
conventional (and thus ordinary) meanings that cannot easily be determined
from combining the meanings of the individual words (and thus are not
compositional based on the sum of the composite parts).71 Justice Ka-
vanaugh is correct that courts should interpret words in light of the overall
meaning of a sentence rather than acontextually.72 But Justice Kavanaugh
must also establish that Title VII’s phrase, “discriminate against any individ-
ual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex,” has some conventional meaning
that differs from the compositional public meaning explicated by Justice
Gorsuch.73 Note that this conventional, public meaning would have to be
based on language usage outside of the Title VII context at the time of statu-
tory enactment in 1964 (to be conventional and consistent with original-
ism),74 as opposed to a meaning that developed after statutory enactment or
that was based on the specific context of Title VII.75 Without such a showing,
his linguistic arguments about literal meaning versus ordinary meaning,
even if correct, would not refute the Court’s reasoning (which was flawed for
other reasons).
In contrast to the majority opinion, the two dissenting opinions viewed
the public meaning question as involving what could be termed empirical
public meaning.76 Both dissenting opinions agreed that the answer to the fol-
70 . Id . at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
71 . Id . at 1826.
72 . See SLOCUM, supra note 45, at 106–08 (arguing that the ordinary meaning determi-
nation should focus on sentence meaning rather than the meaning of individual words).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Court responded to Justice Kavanaugh’s arguments
by pointing out that “the competing dissents [do not] offer an alternative account about what
these terms mean either when viewed individually or in the aggregate.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
1750.
74. Otherwise, Justice Kavanaugh would be making arguments about the specific mean-
ing of Title VII (based on congressional intent or public understanding) rather than an argu-
ment about conventional meaning and the literal meaning versus ordinary meaning debate.
75. As a matter of linguistics, Justice Kavanaugh’s arguments about compound words
are correct. Christiane Fellbaum explains that phrases, such as “fire sale,” that “are not straight-
forwardly (de)composed . . . . constitute lexical units despite their multi-word make-up.”
Christiane Fellbaum, The Treatment of Multi-word Units in Lexicography, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY 411, 411 (Philip Durkin ed., 2015). Thus, the phrases used by
Justice Kavanaugh, such as “cold war,” may be understood as single linguistic units rather than
separate words whose meanings combine in a predictable way. For his examples to be useful,
however, there must be some demonstration that the language in Title VII somehow operates
as a single “lexical unit” with an identifiable conventional meaning. Of course, this understand-
ing would have had to be present in 1964 and based on evidence outside of Title VII.
76. Other than his arguments about literal meaning versus ordinary meaning, Justice
Kavanaugh’s evidence was largely relevant to his framing of the ultimate interpretive question
of how ordinary people at the time of enactment would have construed Title VII’s terms, not to
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lowing question should decide the case: How would the terms of a statute
have been understood and applied by ordinary people at the time of enact-
ment?77 Unlike the case with compositional public meaning, where any em-
pirical inquiry is focused on conventional meanings at the word or phrasal
level, empirical public meaning purports to focus the inquiry on the actual
views that the American public would have had about the ultimate interpre-
tive question in 1964. It assumes that Congress must have enacted exactly
what the public thought it enacted. If taken seriously, however, the question
posed may lead to results that would surprise the dissenting justices. Justice
Alito’s dissenting opinion accused the Court’s opinion of being like a “pirate
ship” because it falsely “sails under a textualist flag,”78 but the interpretive
question posed by the dissenting opinions is not necessarily textualist. The
dissenting justices pose in essence an empirical question about ‘ordinary
people,’ but existing empirical evidence (consistent with linguistic theory)
suggests that ordinary people use normative and purposive reasoning when
interpreting statutory provisions.79
In fact, actual surveys of ordinary people demonstrate a much broader
public understanding of Title VII’s terms than the dissenting justices
acknowledge.80 Indeed, much of the evidence offered by the dissenting opin-
ions was more purposive than textualist in nature, including arguments
about the “social context” in which Title VII was enacted81 and “the societal
norms of the day,”82 as well as “congressional practice,”83 which instructed
establishing the conventional meaning of Title VII’s terms as of 1964. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at
1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
77 . Id . at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is imperative to consider how Americans in
1964 would have understood Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of sex.”); id . at
1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts heed how ‘most people’ ‘would have understood’
the text of a statute when enacted.” (quoting New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539
(2019))).
78 . Id . at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
79. Klapper et al., supra note 65.
80 . Compare Macleod, supra note 52, at 999–1001 (finding that ordinary readers inter-
pret Title VII to cover instances when sex discrimination is not the but-for cause of the firing),
with Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting), and id . at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that ordinary people in 1964 would not have interpreted Title VII to ban firing
an employee because of sexual orientation). While the dissenting justices might object that
these surveys are recent, rather than from 1964, we argue in Part III that societal dynamism,
which should be accepted by originalists, has caused the meaning of Title VII to change over
time. See infra Part III.
81 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that the social context
“may have an important bearing on what [a statute’s] words were understood to mean at the
time of enactment” because “[s]tatutes consist of communications between members of a par-
ticular linguistic community, one that existed in a particular place and at a particular time, and
these communications must therefore be interpreted as they were understood by that commu-
nity at that time”).
82 . Id . at 1769.
83 . Id . at 1829 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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the dissenters that in 1964 discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or transgender status “would not have been evil at all.”84 The dissenting
opinions also relied on dictionary definitions (Justice Alito compiled an ap-
pendix of more than a dozen contemporary dictionary definitions of sex),
but dictionary definitions provide the sort of acontextual word meanings
that Justice Kavanaugh condemned and, in any case, provide at best very in-
direct and conflicting evidence regarding how ordinary people would have
understood and applied Title VII in 1964.85
We do not aim to offer a comprehensive account of the ‘public’ in ‘pub-
lic meaning,’ but we note some problems with empirical public meaning as it
is applied by the dissenting opinions. Perhaps most importantly, even if it is
accepted as a legitimate way to frame public meaning, original empirical
public meaning underdetermines any legal interpretation. By definition, de-
termining in 2021 how an ordinary person would have understood and ap-
plied a statute in 1964 ignores intervening judicial and agency
interpretations and, as we argue later, important legal, societal and linguistic
evolution.86 Furthermore, the standard undervalues the extent to which legal
training and knowledge are integral to statutory interpretation. Statutory in-
terpretation is typically a multilayered process that involves normative deci-
sions, specialized legal competence, and inferences from context. For
instance, judges are generally more competent at evaluating and understand-
ing legislative history or inferences from related provisions than ordinary
people. 87 The empirical-public-meaning approach does raise important
questions about empiricism and statutory interpretation, but it poses a ques-
tion that cannot be answered directly (How would the terms of a statute have
been understood and applied by ordinary people at the time of enactment?),
as though a straightforward answer is possible and should constitute the
court’s interpretation.88
3. Corpus Linguistics as a Tool that Offers Evidence of Public Meaning
Regardless of whether a compositional or an empirical approach to pub-
lic meaning is chosen, judges typically gather information external to them-
84 . Id . at 1774 (Alito, J., dissenting).
85. As we shall demonstrate in Part III, Justice Alito, who staked most of his opinion on
dictionaries, used them selectively and then failed to understand the entries that he reported—
indeed, he failed to understand the best ‘originalist’ argument suggested by the dictionaries. See
infra Part III.
86 . See infra Part III.
87. It would likely be a legal fiction to assume that ordinary people would consult legis-
lative history when interpreting a statute.
88 . Cf . Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L. REV. 311, 339 (1996) (arguing that the “average” in the average-reasonable-person
doctrine “is a normative one, established by an objective community standard that may or may
not be representative of actual human actors”).
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selves about word meanings. As lavishly illustrated in Bostock,89 judges fre-
quently consult dictionary definitions, although such use has been devastat-
ingly criticized by scholars. 90 The criticisms tend to focus on how
dictionaries are misused by courts, such as the arbitrary selection of a defini-
tion within one of many dictionaries.91 A more fundamental criticism is that
judicial reliance on dictionaries in general is problematic.92 A dictionary def-
inition provides a general description of the concept involved but is often
prescriptive rather than descriptive and does not always aim to provide a
necessary and sufficient set of features for membership in the category at is-
sue.93 In fact, “the dictionary takes words away from their common use in
their customary settings,” which “can be highly misleading if used as a basis
of theorizing about what words and their meanings are.”94 Considering dic-
tionaries’ limitations, alternative sources of information about the public
meaning of words such as corpus linguistics will inevitably receive increasing
attention.
Corpus analysis may be a useful source of information about communi-
cations that occur outside of the law, and the sort of information produced
via corpus linguistics is relevant to public meaning.95 Corpus searches can
illustrate such things as “the number of senses (i.e., meanings) a linguistic
expression may have” and the most frequently used meaning (in general or
per context).96 Corpus searches can also provide information about “the
most prototypical meaning of an expression.”97 Importantly, in providing
information about public meaning, corpus analysis can account for context
in ways that dictionary definitions cannot. For instance, “[u]nlike dictionar-
ies, corpus linguistics allows for the meanings of words to be investigated” in
89 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740 (majority opinion); id . at 1756−58, 1784−91 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
90 . See, e .g ., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013)
(citing and expanding upon prior critiques).
91. Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 297–300 (1998) (stating that the level of linguistic analysis performed by
courts rarely rises above “dictionary shopping”).
92. Brudney & Baum, supra note 90.
93 . See Slocum & Wong, supra note 54, at 3; Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning,
134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020) (illustrating through empirical evidence that dictionaries give
broad definitions that may not correspond with the ordinary meanings of words); see also Nick
Riemer, Word Meanings, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WORD 305, 315 (John R. Taylor
ed., 2015) (“A striking feature of dictionary definitions is their variability.”).
94. M.A.K. HALLIDAY & COLIN YALLOP, LEXICOLOGY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 24–25
(2007).
95 . See Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics,
2017 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1422–33 (2017).
96 . Id . at 1441.
97 . Id .
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terms of other words in which they co-occur in natural and authentic con-
texts of ordinary language use.98
One of the leading historical databases for American English is the one
we use in this Article—the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA),
which contains more than 400 million words of text from the 1810s to the
2000s (making it 50–100 times as large as other comparable historical corpo-
ra of English).99 COHA is balanced by genre and by decade. Thus, a contem-
porary judge interpreting a 1964 law barring “vehicles” from the park can
focus her search on sources from the 1950s and 1960s or can look more
broadly (to include the 1940s and 1970s perhaps). She could even engage in a
search of thousands of public documents from the 1850s and 1860s if she
were applying an 1864 no-vehicles-in-the-park regulation to an object found
in the park this year. For the researcher, COHA is therefore particularly use-
ful because it allows comparisons of word usage across decades.
For very old legal documents, like the Constitution of 1789, originalists
have been hampered by the antiquity of the text, which they have tried to
translate to solve modern issues—usually to be embarrassed by evidence
from legal historians that they have fallen prey to gross anachronism, source
cherry-picking, and result-oriented research and reasoning.100 Their efforts
to apply original-public-meaning methodologies to old statutes have been
even less successful.101 A central problem has been that the founding genera-
tion spoke a different language than what we speak today, and the task of
understanding or translation is conceptually as well as linguistically compli-
cated. As we shall see in Part III, even justices who came of age in the 1960s
made elementary mistakes in understanding that decade (and their reliance
on contemporary dictionaries did nothing to ameliorate their anachro-
nisms). Historical corpus research, conducted via scientifically valid princi-
ples, might therefore be a mechanism for judges to approach some questions
98 . Id .
99 . See CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., https://www.english-corpora.org/coha [https://perma.
cc/CJ6L-DSBV?type=image].
100 . See Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or,
The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011); William Michael
Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of
Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007).
101. For example, the textualist assault on Church of the Holy Trinity v . United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892), by Justice Scalia and his allies, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 18–23 (Amy Gutmann ed., new ed. 2018),
has been met with strong and persistent criticism. See Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries
of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901
(2000); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509
(1998) (reviewing SCALIA, supra).
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of public meaning more objectively and neutrally—or at least to check their
intuitions against outside evidence.102
B. Framing the ‘Meaning’ of Original Public Meaning
Understanding the flawed approaches to public meaning in Bostock, as
well as how the interpretation of super-statutes like Title VII should be con-
ducted, also requires a framework for the ‘meaning’ part of original public
meaning. Here especially, insights and knowledge from linguistics and the
philosophy of language can improve the theory and practice of legal inter-
pretation. Original public meaning is, after all, framed by its advocates as a
linguistic concept rather than a normative one dependent on judicial ideolo-
gy.103 As a linguistic concept, the public meaning of a text raises issues of cat-
egorization, which have been of particular interest to linguists.104 In fact,
virtually every issue of legal interpretation involves categorization: whether a
certain intangible concept or concrete object falls within the boundaries of
the category created by the regulatory provision.105 The process of categori-
zation requires an ability to cognitively accommodate both similarities and
differences.106 It is part of inductive generalization, where, for example,
knowing that a creature has (many) features similar to recognized members
of the category ‘dogs,’ and few relevant features shared by non-dogs, enables
one to categorize the creature as a dog.107
102. For an example of excellent corpus linguistic research applied to a legal problem, see
Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpretation: Is
a Minister a Laborer?, 36 GA. ST. L. REV. 491 (2020) (providing corpus research bearing on the
iconic Holy Trinity case, discussed in the previous note).
103 . See Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immer-
sion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1626 (2017) (describing “[p]ublic
meaning originalism” and its connection to the linguistic meaning of the legal text).
104 . See JOAN BYBEE, LANGUAGE CHANGE 196 (2015) (“[W]ords designate categories.
For this reason, research on categories in both psychology and linguistics is relevant to the
study of word meaning.”).
105. In addition to being essential to the operation of the law, categorization is an inte-
gral aspect of human development. See Vladimir M. Sloutsky, The Role of Similarity in the De-
velopment of Categorization, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 246 (2003); see also ZEKI HAMAWAND,
SEMANTICS: A COGNITIVE ACCOUNT OF LINGUISTIC MEANING 135 (2015) (“Categories mirror
human sensory modalities . . . . [T]he conceptual system is organized in terms of categories,
which relate to entities experienced in the world.”).
106. In general, categorization is beneficial because it allows for the organization of
knowledge through the creation of taxonomies that include smaller classes within larger ones
(e.g., Specific Creature → Yorkipoo → Dogs → Animals).
107. In fact, early in their development humans demonstrate the ability to countenance
differences in order to generalize and form categories based on similarities. Sloutsky, supra
note 105, at 246–47.
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1. Extensional Versus Intensional Meaning
In making categorization decisions, judges act in part as quasi lexicogra-
phers.108 So lexicographical standards and principles might be useful for
judges, although many of the choices faced by lexicographers are fairly
straightforward for judges.109 One crucial, but nonobvious and currently un-
recognized, distinction relevant to legal interpretation is between intensional
and extensional ways of analyzing meaning.110 The ‘extensional’ meaning of
a term is the collection of things that fall within the scope of the term.111
Thus, the extensional meaning of planet consists of the objects to which the
term may be correctly applied (the set of Mercury, Venus, and so on).112 In
contrast, the ‘intensional’ meaning of planet consists of the set of attributes
shared by all and only those objects to which the term refers, namely, celes-
tial bodies of a certain size and gravity that orbit a star.113 Terms have both
an extensional and intensional meaning, where the intension determines the
extension but not vice versa.114 Most terms, being noneternal, have different
108. Judges are quasi lexicographers at least for the purposes of resolving an interpretive
dispute and justifying that decision in a written opinion.
109 . See generally Dirk Geeraerts, Meaning and Definition, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
LEXICOGRAPHY 83 (Piet van Sterkenburg ed., 2003) (describing some of the choices faced by
lexicographers). For instance, one typical choice for the legal interpreter is to focus on deter-
mining referential, descriptive meaning (“denotational meaning”), as opposed to something
like “emotive meaning” (describing the emotional overtone of the word, e.g., pejorative). See
id . at 86–87.
110. The distinction is similar to the sense/reference distinction made famous by Gottlob
Frege. See Gottlob Frege, Über Sinn und Bedeutung [On Sense and Reference], 100 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892), translated in THE FREGE READER
151 (Michael Beaney ed., 1997). The sense/reference distinction has been proposed as a theory
of originalism in constitutional law. See, e .g ., Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense–
Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 564 (2006).
111 . See Luca Gasparri & Diego Marconi, Word Meaning, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Mar. 21,
2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/word-meaning [https://perma.cc
/ETH8-D292]. Complex expressions also have extensions. David Braun, Extension, Intension,
Character, and Beyond, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 9
(Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012).
112 . See Gasparri & Marconi, supra note 111.
113 . See id .; see also BYBEE, supra note 104, at 196 (describing intension as “a statement
of the defining features of the category the word designates”). For instance, consider NASA’s
definition of a planet:
(1) It must orbit a star (in our cosmic neighborhood, the Sun).
(2) It must be big enough to have enough gravity to force it into a spherical shape.
(3) It must be big enough that its gravity cleared away any other objects of a similar size
near its orbit around the Sun.
What Is a Planet?, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets
/in-depth [https://perma.cc/8BS3-763N].
114. FrancescoOrilia,MeaningandCircularDefinitions, 29J.PHIL.LOGIC,155,163(2000).
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extensions at different times.115 For example, in 1920 the extension of air-
plane did not include any jets, but its extension in 2021 does.116 In contrast,
even though its extension will change constantly over short periods of time,
the intensional meaning of airplane might, theoretically, remain stable for
long stretches of time.117 Thus, two expressions with the same intension have
the same extension, but two expressions with the same extension may have
different intensions.118 For example, the term renate has the same extension
as the term cordate, but the intension of renate is ‘animal with a kidney’
whereas the intension of cordate is ‘animal with a heart.’119
In a legal context, it may seem intuitive that meaning should be framed
in terms of intension, which is consistent with the typical judicial process of
determining the intensional meaning (by reference to a statutory definition,
a precedent, or a dictionary) of the term at issue before applying that mean-
ing to the facts of the case.120 Although fraught with difficulties, it is not un-
common to approach interpretive disputes by determining only the exten-
extension of an expression, and using corpus linguistics may facilitate this
process.121 For example, Justice Thomas Lee and Stephen Mouritsen used
corpus analysis to consider whether airplanes and bicycles are ‘vehicles’
regulated by a Hartian no-vehicles-in-the-park statute.122 Their paper exam-
ined collocation, which reveals “the words that are statistically most likely to
appear in the same context as vehicle for a given period,”123 and concordance
data, which “allows [] users to review a particular word or phrase in hun-
dreds of contexts, all on the same page of running text.”124 From this infor-
mation, the authors concluded that airplanes and bicycles “are attested in the
data as possible examples of vehicle” but are “unusual—not the most fre-
quent and not even common.”125
Lee and Mouritsen thus did not offer an intensional definition of vehicle
based on their corpus research but, instead, focused on the frequency with
115 . See Wayne A. Davis, On Nonindexical Contextualism, 163 PHIL. STUD. 561, 562 (2013).
116 . See id .
117 . See id . This would obviously depend on the lexicographical approach taken by the
interpreter.
118 . See Braun, supra note 111, at 10.
119 . See id .
120. Some would argue that extensions are not plausible candidates for the meanings of
expressions because expressions that have the same extension (coextensive expressions) can
differ in meaning. Id . at 10. See Geeraerts, supra note 109, at 89 (explaining that intensional
meanings are the ones generally used in dictionaries).
121. An interpretive dispute is resolved once it is determined whether the statutory term
includes within its scope the object or concept in question; determining the extension of the
statutory term necessarily resolves that dispute.
122 . See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 836, 859.
123 . Id . at 837.
124 . Id . at 832.
125 . Id . at 859.
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which the word airplane occurs around vehicle.126 With an extensional ap-
proach to meaning, the interpreter must sort through the collocation, con-
cordance, and other data and make a determination about whether the
producers of the texts being searched demonstrated a belief (even if indirect-
ly) that some concept falls within the scope of the category at issue. This de-
termination will thus be based on the “evaluation of some kind of
frequencies.”127 There must therefore be some standard above which the fre-
quency of instances can be said to represent category membership. If, for ex-
ample, airplanes are not mentioned in the same contexts as “vehicles,” the
interpreter might conclude that airplanes likely do not fall under the ‘vehicle’
concept.128 But frequencies of co-occurrence alone are an insufficient basis
on which to determine category membership.129 Furthermore, with a corpus
analysis focused on extensional meaning, the researcher will seek infor-
mation regarding whether an object such as an airplane or a bicycle is re-
ferred to as a vehicle or occurs in the vicinity of vehicle in a text, but such
research will not likely capture all the objects that might be considered vehi-
cles.130 Additional research would be required to determine whether any of
these other objects (perhaps some new skateboard-like mechanism) is a ve-
hicle.131
In contrast, an intensional approach seeks to create a definition for a
given concept. Thus, an intensional approach that understands ‘vehicle’ in
terms of the most salient attributes of the category is particularly useful to a
judge whose decision may set the legal standard for future cases.132 If the
term is defined in terms of its necessary and sufficient or its salient fea-
126 . Id . at 837–38. Thus, the focus was on whether “[some noun] is a vehicle.” Gries &
Slocum, supra note 95, at 1466. Note, though, that this inquiry does not necessarily include
investigation into whether a particular corpus file included an assertion that, for example, an
airplane is a vehicle but merely collects data about whether the two terms appear together.
127. Stefan Th. Gries, What Is Corpus Linguistics?, 3 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS COMPASS
1225, 1226 (2009).
128 . See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 859.
129. Stefan Th. Gries, Corpus Linguistics and the Law: Extending the Field from a Statisti-
cal Perspective, 86 BROOKLYN L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 19) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
130. Likely, there are too many objects to research and, in any case, advances in technol-
ogy will create new objects to evaluate.
131. The Segway is a two-wheeled, self-balancing personal transporter brought to market
in 2001 that has an electric motor and a maximum speed of 12.5 miles per hour. Matt McFar-
land, Segway Was Supposed to Change the World . Two Decades Later, It Just Might, CNN BUS.
(Oct. 30, 2018, 1:04 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/30/tech/segway-history/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KY32-C4MG].
132 . See infra notes 190–197 and accompanying text (describing the attributes of ‘vehi-
cle’); see also Gries & Slocum, supra note 95, at 1468 (discussing how the category ‘vehicle’ can
be defined in terms of its attributes).
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tures,133 those features can be compared to the features of a given concept or
object, and a category determination can be made.134 For instance, a proto-
type for the ‘vehicle’ category may be created and the attributes of objects
such as airplanes and bicycles can be compared in order to determine mem-
bership in the category.135 Although the specification is likely to be underde-
termined—will fail to provide criteria that will uncontroversially determine
in all situations whether the concept or object in question falls under the rel-
evant category136—an intensional approach, unlike an extensional one, will
apply generally to concepts that were not specifically investigated by the in-
terpreter.137 Additionally, the interpreter can combine the two approaches by
identifying core examples covered by the statutory term and capping the ex-
emplars with an inclusive ellipsis (‘and other things having such-and-such
qualities’).138
Deciding these categorization questions via an intensional approach to
meaning, with the intension fixed at the time of enactment, presents some
challenges for the interpreter. The most important consideration is the de-
termination of the constituent, and therefore defining, features of the rele-
vant statutory term. As researchers have established through
133 . See infra note 181 (explaining that the most salient attributes for a category are those
with a high cue validity for the category).
134 . See infra Section II.C. (analyzing whether a Segway is a vehicle).
135 . See Gries & Slocum, supra note 95, at 1468–69. Although the ‘prototype’ concept
can be defined in different ways, one way to do it is by viewing a prototype as an abstract enti-
ty, rather than a concrete exemplar, which consists of the combination of the most salient at-
tributes of the category. See Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, Judging Corpus Linguistics, 94
S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 13, 28 (2020).
136. Underdeterminacy “does not entail that there is no fact of the matter as regards the
proposition expressed, but rather that it cannot be determined by linguistic meaning alone.”
ROBYN CARSTON, THOUGHTS AND UTTERANCES: THE PRAGMATICS OF EXPLICIT
COMMUNICATION 20–21 (2002). In contrast, ‘underspecificity’ involves situations where it is
undetermined which of several determinate meanings were intended. See Una Stojnić, Mat-
thew Stone & Ernie Lepore, Distinguishing Ambiguity from Underspecificity, in PRAGMATICS,
TRUTH AND UNDERSPECIFICATION: TOWARDS AN ATLAS OF MEANING 149, 149–50 (Ken
Turner & Laurence Horn eds., 2018). Thus, one way of treating ambiguity is to assert that a
term, such as bank, has a single lexical entry with an underspecified meaning because the word
itself does not specify which of the typical meanings was intended (e.g., a river bank or a finan-
cial institution). See Mixingmemory, Polysemy Is Like Homonomy, Only Different,
SCIENCEBLOGS (Nov. 3, 2006), http://scienceblogs.com/mixingmemory/2006/11/03/polysemy-
is-like-homonomy-only [https://perma.cc/BW36-BQK4]. Of course, sentential context often
can help specify the correct meaning.
137. Thus, neither societal dynamism nor linguistic dynamism can be accounted for un-
der an extensional approach unless it is nonoriginalist.
138. Notice the relevance of the foregoing analysis for statutory drafting and interpreta-
tion. Most statutes contain a provision containing definitions of key statutory terms. But defi-
nitions can be either extensional or intensional. The former kind of definition would list the
items falling within the statutory term. The latter would describe the features found in all ob-
jects that fall within the intended definition. Some definitions include elements of both—lists
of included items together with a broad residual phrase (‘including other stuff’).
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psycholinguistic theories of how people perceive categories, in many situa-
tions a category cannot be defined by means of a single set of necessary and
sufficient attributes.139 Instead, “categories [often] exhibit a family resem-
blance structure” that may consist of “a radial set of clustered and overlap-
ping readings.”140 Instead of ‘behaving’ as if defined by a simple and clear-
cut set of criterial (i.e., necessary and sufficient) features, categories exhibit a
wide range of prototype effects, the most relevant of which is that they often
appear not to have sharply delimited borders with clear demarcations. Thus,
“categories . . . are [often] only unambiguously defined in their focal points,”
the so-called prototypes, and have one or more sets of properties or attrib-
utes that are characteristic and not defining.141
2. The Advantages of Intensional Meaning for Legal Interpretation
Notwithstanding the challenges involved for the interpreter (which are
normal aspects of legal interpretation), there are significant benefits to an
intensional approach, as compared to an extensional approach, in framing
originalism for statutory or constitutional interpretation. Unlike an exten-
sional approach, an intensional approach can accommodate changes to soci-
ety over time while still hewing to originalist premises.142 Consider the
139. By the 1970s, the classical view of categorization began suffering sustained criti-
cisms. See Eleanor H. Rosch, Natural Categories, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 328 (1973); Eleanor H.
Rosch, On the Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories, in COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 111 (Timothy E. Moore ed., 1973); Elea-
nor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 192
(1975). Rosch and others such as William Labov, The Boundaries of Words and Their Mean-
ings, in NEW WAYS OF ANALYZING VARIATION IN ENGLISH 340 (Charles-James N. Bailey &
Roger W. Shuy eds., 1973), are typically credited with severely undermining the classical view.
In contrast to the traditional view, Rosch argued that perceptually based categories do not have
sharply delimited borders with clear demarcations between equally important concepts. From
her field experiments, Rosch concluded that defining categories in a rigid manner is incon-
sistent with psychological reality. Unsurprisingly, prototype theory has had a significant im-
pact on conceptual analysis. Patrick Hanks, for instance, has deemed it “[p]robably the most
influential development of the twentieth century from the point of view of conceptual analy-
sis.” PATRICK HANKS, LEXICAL ANALYSIS: NORMS AND EXPLOITATIONS 340 (2013).
140. GEERAERTS, supra note 19, at 187. Famously, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that the
concept ‘game’ cannot be defined by properties that are shared by all other games. Instead of
being capable of being defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, the different members of
the category share properties with various other members. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 53–67, at 30–36 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte ed.,
G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte trans., rev. 4th ed. 2009).
141. GEERAERTS, supra note 19, at 185, 189–90. Some legal scholars have recognized
these features of meaning. Most famously, Hart argued that most legal rules have a “core of
settled meaning” but are surrounded by a “penumbra of debatable cases.” Hart, supra note 15,
at 607.
142. Even when the originalism constraint is eliminated an intensional approach offers
an advantage, because the concept defined in terms of its constituent features can be applied to
new and changed situations without revisiting the definition. An extensional approach requires
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Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.”143 An
originalist extensional meaning, such as that championed by Justice Scalia,
would include those punishments that were “cruel and unusual” in 1791 and
exclude those that were not.144 By doing so, the list of known punishments in
1791 would be fixed as either prohibited or allowed. Yet Justice Scalia also
acknowledged the necessity of recognizing some form of societal dyna-
mism.145 He realized that determining the meaning of a constitutional provi-
sion solely in terms of its original extension is wholly inadequate to
adjudicate cases that will inevitably arise due to new practices and technolo-
gies.146 On Justice Scalia’s view, the Eighth Amendment is therefore also an
“abstract principle,” “rooted in the moral perceptions” of 1791, that can be
applied to “all sorts of tortures quite unknown at the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted.”147
Thus, while Justice Scalia recognized societal dynamism to some extent,
his position that the extension of the Eighth Amendment should be consid-
ered both fixed in 1791 (to address punishments that then existed) and not
fixed in 1791 (to allow for consideration of punishments that did not then
exist) is an undertheorized mixture of intensionalist and extensionalist views
of meaning. The evaluation of “tortures quite unknown at the time the
Eighth Amendment was adopted,” as Justice Scalia advocates, requires an
intensional meaning, even if schematic.148 Consider an intensional meaning
that defines “cruel and unusual” in terms of its features. For instance, “unu-
sual” might mean “contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage.’ ”149 This
understanding could then be applied to newer punishments that exist in
2021 (but did not in 1791). But why should the amendment be limited to
those applications?150 For instance, what about punishments that were well
that the same analysis (is this object within the scope of the concept) be performed from
scratch each time the concept is applied to a new or changed situation.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”)
144 . See SCALIA, supra note 101, at 145.
145 . Id . Yet Justice Scalia believed that having to choose between intensional and exten-
sional meaning (of course, he did not use those terms) presented a “false dichotomy.” Id .
146 . Id .
147 . Id . In his 2012 book, Justice Scalia reiterated his view that “[i]n their full context,
words mean what they conveyed to reasonable people at the time they were written—with the
understanding that general terms may embrace later technological innovations.” SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 47, at 16.
148. SCALIA, supra note 101, at 145.
149. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008) (“[T]he word ‘unusual’ was a
term of art that referred to government practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemo-
rial usage.’ ”). In turn, “cruel” could mean “unjustly harsh,” not “motivated by cruel intent.” See
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441 (2017).
150 . Cf . JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 7 (2011) (discussing the theory of original
expected applications); see also John F. Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, 95 NOTRE
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known and not “unusual” in 1791 but were “unusual” by 2021?151 Justice
Scalia does not offer a convincing account of why originalism cannot coun-
tenance the sort of societal dynamism where punishments become “unusual”
over time. 152 It may be possible to defend a mixed intensionalist–
extensionalist approach, but accounting for social dynamism explains Su-
preme Court precedents better than Justice Scalia’s version of originalism.153
With the above discussion in mind, recall the interpretive question
posed by the dissenting opinions in Bostock: How would the terms of a stat-
ute have been understood and applied by ordinary people at the time of en-
actment?154 It is simple to see that the dissenting opinions had an empirical-
public-meaning approach (as discussed in the last section) that sought to de-
termine the extensional meaning of Title VII as it existed in 1964.155 In con-
DAME L. REV. 39 (2019) (addressing the constitutionality of “experimental punishments” that
did not exist in 1791).
151. Alternatively, the features of the punishment (capital punishment, for instance) may
have changed over time, thereby demonstrating societal dynamism and (potentially) changing
the application of the “cruel and unusual” standard. See supra note 149 (offering a definition of
“cruel”).
152. Still, apart from the merits of Justice Scalia’s claims, if the public meaning of a provi-
sion is being determined, inferences from surrounding provisions may be relevant to its inter-
pretation. Thus, even if Justice Scalia’s view of the simultaneously fixed and unfixed extension
of the Eighth Amendment is rejected, an intensional meaning must be determined that takes
account of both semantic evidence regarding the meaning of “cruel and unusual” and pragmat-
ic evidence of the broader context of the provision. See infra note 163 (describing ‘pragmatic’
evidence). A better argument for Justice Scalia, then, would be that the pragmatic evidence he
cites modulates the semantic meaning of “cruel and unusual” (and thus the public meaning of
the provision) and narrows the range of things to which the term applies so that it does not
include capital punishment.
153 . See, e .g ., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (ruling that execution of minors
was “cruel and unusual” punishment, over a heated Scalia dissent arguing, inter alia, that there
was no national consensus sufficient to render this “unusual”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010) (ruling that life sentence without parole for minors in noncapital cases was “cruel and
unusual” punishment over an Alito/Thomas/Scalia dissent).
154 . See supra note 77 and accompanying text; Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731,
1766 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
155 . See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. An intensional approach does not
have to correspond to the compositional approach adopted by the majority in Bostock. For in-
stance, a term or phrase can be defined in terms of its intension, even though it is not composi-
tional. An idiomatic expression would be such an example (‘He kicked the bucket’—the
meaning of this idiomatic expression cannot be determined by combining the meanings of the
individual words). Similarly, one or more of the terms in a provision can be given a special
meaning that fits the relevant context, even though it would be given a different meaning in
other contexts. In the same way, an empirical approach to interpretation does not have to fol-
low the extensional approach taken by the dissenting opinions in Bostock. The dissenting opin-
ions adopted an empirical-public-meaning approach that viewed the empirical question in
terms of the extension of Title VII (or section 703(a)(1)), but the empirical question could be
defined more narrowly and generally, such as ‘What would ordinary people have thought was
included within the scope of the term sex in 1964?’ Thus, both the majority and dissenting
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trast, Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court showed very little interest in
what categories of Americans were protected by Title VII in 1964 but saw it
as his task to figure out the intensional meaning of the Title VII language in
1964.156 This replicates the contrasting approaches to meaning followed by
Justice Scalia (extensional) and the Court majority (intensional) in the
Eighth Amendment cases. It might be an originalist tenet that the meaning
of regulatory terms should be fixed as of the time of enactment (“what they
conveyed to reasonable people at the time,” in the words of Justice Scalia),157
but that expression of the tenet leaves open the question of whether you are
talking about extensional meaning (Alito) or intensional meaning (Gor-
such).
The choice between intensional and extensional meaning should not be
a difficult one for originalists. It is hard to take seriously a constitutional or
statutory-interpretation theory that valorizes exclusively the extensional
meanings of provisions the year they were adopted. Neither Justice Alito nor
Justice Thomas has followed an extensional approach in Second Amend-
ment cases. In McDonald v . City of Chicago,158 Justice Alito wrote the plurali-
ty opinion holding that the Second Amendment applied to the states under
the Due Process Clause;159 Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion accom-
plished the same result through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.160 Both
justices assumed that the amendment assured Chicago residents the use of
weapons unheard of in 1791 (or 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
added). Justice Gorsuch made the same point in Bostock for Title VII: the list
of activities the American public would have considered ‘discrimination be-
cause of sex’ in 1964 might not have included the “sexual harassment” of
working women, the refusal to promote a woman who was too masculine, or
the “homosexual hazing” of a man by his male coworkers.161 Yet, with an in-
tensional approach to meaning, social dynamism can change the coverage of
Title VII, even under an originalist perspective. As we shall demonstrate in
Part III, moreover, Justice Alito missed his best argument because he de-
clined to apply an intensional approach to Title VII that incorporated a
normative dimension into original public meaning.
opinions adopted certain combinations of the compositional/empirical and intension-
al/extensional concepts, but other combinations are also possible.
156 . See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738–41. That is, other than the meaning of “sex” that the
Court adopted for purposes of the opinion.
157 . See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 47, at 16.
158. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
159 . McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (applying District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008), to state and local governments).
160 . Id . at 806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
161. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751 (“[A]pplying protective laws to groups that were political-
ly unpopular at the time of the law’s passage—whether prisoners in the 1990s or homosexual
and transgender employees in the 1960s—often may be seen as unexpected.”).
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II. DEMONSTRATING THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC MEANING OVER TIME (THE
NO-VEHICLES HYPOTHETICAL)
Thus far, we have outlined our views of ‘public’ and ‘meaning,’ which
require that the interpreter make various choices about how to frame public
meaning, such as between intensional and extensional meaning.162 Regard-
less of the approach selected, the interpretive dispute will likely involve an
issue of categorization requiring an interpreter to consider a range of evi-
dence, including both information about word meanings that cuts across
contexts and information regarding the specific context of the statute.163 The
cross-contextual information informs the general meaning of the statutory
language, which the other evidence helps situate within the specific context
and purpose of the statute.164 Ultimately, the interpreter must synthesize the
general and specific information into criteria for determining category
membership. The task is often not easy, as the foregoing analysis suggests. In
fact, judges have long struggled to give undefined terms in legal texts mean-
ings that are general, unconnected to their policy preferences, and sufficient-
ly flexible to adapt to new circumstances.165
The difficulties associated with attempts to define even commonplace
words like vehicle were classically presented by H.L.A. Hart’s famous hypo-
thetical, which “forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park.”166 The is-
sues of meaning raised by the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical are
relevant to interpretation generally, and we start with Justice Kavanaugh’s
162 . See supra Part I.
163. Information about word meanings that cut across contexts is often referred to as
‘semantic’ information, while information about how words are used in specific contexts is
often referred to as ‘pragmatic’ information. Semantics concerns the conventional meaning of
the representation and pragmatics the “contributions of the ambient circumstances.”
PRASHANT PARIKH, LANGUAGE AND EQUILIBRIUM 6 (2010). The traditional conception is that
semantics “first underspecifies content that is later filled in by pragmatics.” Id . Semantics
therefore accounts for meaning by relating, via the rules of the language and abstracting away
from specific contexts, linguistic expressions to the world objects to which they refer. See MIRA
ARIEL, DEFINING PRAGMATICS 6 (2010) (describing the “semantics/pragmatics division of la-
bor”). Thus, the semantic meaning of a sentence consists of the “common core of meaning
shared by every utterance of it.” DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE:
COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 9 (2d ed. 1995). In turn, pragmatics accounts for meaning
by reference to the language user (producer or interpreter), and it involves inferential process-
es. See ARIEL supra, at 24–28. Pragmatics takes account of contextual factors, such as the mutu-
al knowledge shared by the speaker and addressee, even if such information is not explicitly
reflected in the syntactic properties of the sentence. See id . at 28.
164 . See ARIEL, supra note 163, at 28.
165. Ordinary people in nonlegal situations are also susceptible to biases when categoriz-
ing objects. See Theodore J. Noseworthy & Miranda R. Goode, Contrasting Rule-Based and
Similarity-Based Category Learning: The Effects of Mood and Prior Knowledge on Ambiguous
Categorization, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 362 (2011) (describing how a person’s “mood” can
influence categorization decisions).
166 . See Hart, supra note 15, at 607.
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use of that enduring hypothetical in Bostock. Our main focus, though, re-
mains the temporal issues created by long-standing laws. We apply our no-
tion of intensional meaning, along with corpus linguistics, to address some
of the temporal complications involved in determining original public
meaning.167 Specifically, we illustrate three interconnected circumstances
under which judges committed to neutrality and restraint ought to apply the
no-vehicles statute differently in 2021 than they would have in 1964: (1) so-
cietal dynamism, where the object of interpretation did not exist at the time
of statutory enactment or where the object of interpretation did exist at the
time of statutory enactment but its features have significantly changed; (2)
linguistic dynamism, where the meaning of a statutory term has changed
over time; and (3) normative dynamism, where a new constitutional or so-
cial moral context changes the applicability of statutory terms.168 Our dis-
tinction between societal and linguistic dynamism appears to be significant
to many originalists, but we question whether the distinction can be coher-
ently maintained by judges, even those who view themselves as originalist.169
Normative dynamism may be a deeper challenge for originalists, but we join
the late Justice Scalia in arguing for the relevance that new constitutional
limits or social norms might have for the current application of statutes.
A. Difficulties with the Basic No-Vehicles Hypothetical, Involving No Time
Gap Between Enactment and Application
Hart’s no-vehicles hypothetical classically frames the challenges caused
by the difficulties of categorizing objects and defining words (such as vehicle)
and the consequent fuzziness (often labeled as vagueness) associated with
such attempts.170 Hart’s hypothetical reflects an underlying belief that a
word’s semantic meaning is to some degree generalizable across contexts
and not based on any specific interpretive clues that can be traced to the
drafter of the text. Thus, Hart asserted that the rule clearly “forbids an auto-
mobile.”171 Yet, as Hart also recognized, the inherent flexibility of words
means that there will be “a penumbra of debatable cases,” making it uncer-
tain whether things such as bicycles are included within the domain of vehi-
167. As we have suggested above, evidence of public understanding from decades or even
centuries ago is harder to find or create (you cannot run in-person experiments on the Found-
ing Fathers), and any evidence found will be hard to translate into modern language. See supra
note 103 and accompanying text.
168 . See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
169. At least some forms of societal dynamism are accepted by originalists and thus dis-
tinguished from linguistic dynamism. See supra Section I.B.2.
170 . See generally Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978) (describing the challenges
of categorization); Sloutsky, supra note 105, at 246 (describing how categorization works).
171. Hart, supra note 15, at 607 (emphasis added).
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cle.172 Hart did not explain, however, how an interpreter identifies the “core
of settled meaning” or the parameters of the category.173 That is, he did not
explain how a judge should identify criteria for determining membership in
a category like vehicle.
The hypothetical has intrigued some textualists who want to ‘solve’ it by
relying on the determinacy of language. Most prominently, Justice Scalia and
Bryan Garner addressed the hypothetical in their 2012 book.174 Despite indi-
cating that judges “should consult (without apology) what the lexicographers
say,” the authors found dictionary definitions of vehicle to be too broad and
inclusive (implicitly based on their view that such a statute would not be in-
tended or understood to include everything that would fall under a diction-
ary definition).175 Instead, Scalia and Garner created (without citing any
linguistic authority or analysis) their own definition: “The proper colloquial
meaning in our view (not all of them are to be found in dictionaries) is simp-
ly a sizable wheeled conveyance (as opposed to one of any size that is motor-
ized).” 176 Armed with this self-created definition, they announced that
“remote-controlled model cars, baby carriages, [and] tricycles” would not
fall under it.177 Apart from the paucity of identified features characteristic of
a vehicle, how does one decide whether an object is sufficiently “sizable”? If
the definition of vehicle sets forth necessary and sufficient conditions that
include anything that is (1) sizable, (2) wheeled, and (3) a conveyance, then
there must be some size threshold for the category. But Scalia and Garner do
not offer any standard for evaluating what is “sizable.”178 Notwithstanding
their goal of demonstrating an interpretive methodology that will produce
consistent answers across judges, Scalia and Garner express uncertainty con-
cerning the application of their definition to bicycles, indicating that they are
172 . Id . The “domain” refers to the objects to which the word at issue should be applied.
173 . See id .
174 . See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 47, at 36 (claiming that “judges who use the fair-
reading method will arrive at fairly consistent answers” because the “relevant line of inquiry is
pretty straightforward”).
175 . See id . at 36–37 (conceding that “[a]nything that is ever called a vehicle (in the rele-
vant sense) would fall within these definitions”).
176. Id . at 37.
177. Id . at 37–38.
178. Justice Scalia’s failure to provide some criterion for judgments about the “sizable”
threshold undoubtedly benefits his analysis, considering that any attempt to precisify “sizable”
would reveal the arbitrary and discretionary nature of a cutoff that is based on language alone.
Certainly, what is “sizable” depends on context, as does the meaning of any gradable adjective
(e.g., tall, fast). See generally DIANA RAFFMAN, UNRULY WORDS: A STUDY OF VAGUE
LANGUAGE (2014). The relevant context most importantly includes the object that the adjective
sizable modifies. A “sizable building” is different from a “sizable human,” but what is a “sizable
conveyance”? Does any car qualify, even though cars vary dramatically in size? Considering
that Justice Scalia does not list cars as objects to be considered under the statute, see SCALIA &
GARNER, supra note 47, at 36, it would appear he would assert that any sort of car (only if de-
signed for travel on public roads or to transport humans?) would qualify as a vehicle.
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“perhaps” not vehicles (albeit confirming later that they are not vehicles),
and Segways, indicating that they are “perhaps” vehicles.179
Justice Kavanaugh’s analysis in Bostock reflects a similar belief that the
ordinary meaning of a term within a specific context can be known even
without any supporting evidence or empirical analysis. He asserts that “[a]
statutory ban on ‘vehicles in the park’ would literally encompass a baby
stroller” but that “the word ‘vehicle,’ in its ordinary meaning, does not en-
compass baby strollers.”180 As a general matter, it is true that a traditional
baby stroller may well not be a vehicle. Certainly, as our corpus analysis re-
veals, a baby stroller is not a prototypical vehicle because it does not exhibit
the salient characteristics for the category ‘vehicle.’181
As our analysis of the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA)
reveals, the relevant prototype and features of ‘vehicle’ seem to be an auto-
mobile with an engine, wheels, and tires that transports at least one person,
and perhaps other goods (often for economic reasons and on roads), for
which licensing might be required. A baby stroller, though, is not self-
propelled in the sense that it does not move on its own or because of actions
by the person being conveyed. Rather, it moves because of force applied by a
person other than the passenger,182 has no engine or motor of any kind, typi-
cally moves on sidewalks and not roads, has a speed that corresponds to that
of a pedestrian as opposed to more typical vehicles that surpass that speed,
and has a limited capacity for conveying goods in addition to the passen-
ger(s) it conveys. Is a baby stroller nevertheless a vehicle? It depends on the
importance one attaches to the above criteria, but it is less likely to be con-
sidered a vehicle than motorized wheelchairs or even regular wheelchairs.
Justice Kavanaugh’s assertion that the “literal meaning” of vehicle in-
cludes baby strollers is puzzling.183 We think he is equating “literal meaning”
with the intensional approach taken by the majority and is trying to demon-
strate the problems with such an approach. That is, a broad dictionary defi-
179. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 47, at 38.
180. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
181. Regarding salient features,
[t]he most salient attributes for a category are those with a high cue validity for the cate-
gory. The cue validity of an attribute A of object X with regard to a category C is the
conditional probability of X being a member of category C if or given that X has attrib-
ute A: p(C|A). In other words, a robin (the object X) is a “good” bird (the category C)
because it has many of the attributes A1-n that are highly predictive of something being a
bird (e.g., if something has a beak (A1), it is most likely a bird; if something (also) has
feathers (A2), it is most likely a bird), not because we encounter it so frequently or talk
about it so frequently (although frequency and even dispersion may of course help in
making something seem prototypical).
Gries & Slocum, supra note 95, at 1468 & n.207.
182. We could call this person the ‘driver’ (i.e., the person responsible for the speed and
direction of movement).
183. Bostock, 140 S. Ct at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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nition of vehicle or stroller can be found, converted into necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for membership in the ‘vehicle’ category, and then applied
to the features of baby strollers.184 If so, he is right that such a methodology
will not deliver the ordinary meaning of a term (as Justice Scalia learned). If
Kavanaugh means that a baby stroller is sometimes (often? usually?) referred
to as a vehicle as a general matter (as one might expect if ordinary meaning
is what he is after), but not in the specific context of a no-vehicles-in-the-
park prohibition, he offers no proof or analysis of these assertions.
B. New Things in the World
Whatever the normal difficulties of applying a no-vehicles statute soon
after its enactment, the passage of time will present temporal issues that
judges typically do not acknowledge or handle well. Those applying our 1964
no-vehicles statute will be confronted with new things or circumstances over
time, and many of these instances of social dynamism could not have been
anticipated. Consider Segways: are they barred from the park by our 1964
statute (recall that Justice Scalia says “perhaps” even without the temporal
issue being present)? Segways did not exist on the market until 2001 and
thus were unknown in 1964.185 In COHA the first mention of Segways oc-
curs in 2002 (in an article on legislating Segways’ use of sidewalks).186 Seg-
ways today may fit the statutory language, even if not as snugly as
automobiles: they have battery-powered motors and convey people from one
place to another, at the stately speed of around ten to twelve miles an
hour.187 Does original public meaning nevertheless require that Segways be
dismissed from the statutory coverage out of hand (meaning that they can
never be considered vehicles), simply because they could not have been with-
in the extension of the statute when enacted? (Justice Alito suggested as
184. See SOLAN, supra note 39, at 66–70 (describing how judges often inappropriately
convert dictionary definitions into necessary-and-sufficient tests for membership within the
category). So we looked up stroller in the 1961 print of Webster’s Second and found that it
might include ‘baby carriage.’ WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2499 (2d ed.
1961). Webster’s defines carriage as, among other things, “[a] wheeled vehicle for persons.” Id .
at 411. Make of this what you will . . .
185 . See supra note 131. In fact, Segways are no longer being built, making it likely that
they will eventually cease to be an extensional category member of ‘vehicle.’ Rachel Treisman,
After Nearly Two Bumpy Decades, the Original Segway Will Be Retired in July, NPR (June 23,
2020, 6:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/23/882536320/after-nearly-two-bumpy-decades
-the-original-segway-will-be-retired-in-july [https://perma.cc/555V-WZLQ].
186. Robert Zielinski, Letter to the Editor, Sidewalk Is No Place, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 19,
2002, at 42.
187 . E .g ., Segway x2 SE, SEGWAY, https://www.segway.com/segway-x2-se [https://perma
.cc/AR49-MW2U]. Thus, it is likely that anyone who considers a bike a vehicle would have to
consider a Segway one.
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much for transgender persons when he complained that the word
transgender did not exist in the English language in 1964.)188
SEGWAYS IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
Any theory of original public meaning that would exclude Segways out
of hand would be a highly impractical theory of interpretation, for it would
make many regulatory statutes ineffective. Recall that Justice Scalia, the god-
father of original public meaning, was open to including new things in long-
standing legal provisions, and he joined Justices Thomas and Alito in think-
ing that the Second Amendment protects thousands of firearms that did not
exist in 1791 or 1868.189 Certainly, from the 1960s features of vehicle, it seems
that, on the basis of semantics alone, one could consider a Segway a vehicle
in the sense that it is a conveyance with wheels/tires and an engine that
transports one human with maybe some ‘luggage,’ sometimes on (shared)
roads, sometimes on bike paths.190 If so, the original intensional meaning of
vehicle has remained constant even though its extensional meaning has ex-
panded. Now, if one adds legal considerations to the mix (the speed at which
Segways travel, their likelihood of causing harm in accidents, the degree to
which they affect other traffic in a park, and so forth), then of course statuto-
ry purpose might resolve any doubt as to whether Segways fall within the
statute.
188. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1772–73 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
189. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Scalia, J.); supra notes 158–
161 and accompanying text. We are not aware of any originalist who would disagree.
190. Such a conclusion would depend in part on how engine is defined. See infra note 210
(discussing the definition of an internal-combustion engine).
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C. Old Things That Have Changed
How might our hypothetical statute apply to a mechanism that existed
in 1964 but whose features have significantly changed since enactment?
Consider, for instance, wheelchairs. They were well known in 1964, but it is
doubtful they would have been considered vehicles under the statute, what-
ever its purpose. Would the 1964 answer change if a motorized wheelchair
entered the park? COHA data from the 1960s reveal only a single reference
to a motorized wheelchair, suggesting that such a mechanism did exist but
was not salient at the time. Using the 1960s prototype from the Segway anal-
ysis, and considering ordinary-meaning semantics alone, a judge in 1964
may well conclude that a wheelchair is not a vehicle even in the unusual situ-
ation where it is equipped with a motor. The judge might reason that even if
the motorized wheelchair is a conveyance with wheels or tires and an engine
that transports one human with maybe some luggage, the 1964 version is not
intended for use on roads (or even bike paths).
Of course, this general sense of vehicle and motorized wheelchair must be
applied in light of the entire context of the statute, which might include the
purpose of the legal prohibition, the statute creating or regulating the park
itself, the ambit of the state’s vehicles code, agency application of the law to
these mechanisms vel non, and so forth.191 Nevertheless, after the judge in
1964 considers the semantic and contextual evidence, she would probably
conclude that the statute does not bar motorized wheelchairs.192 Beyond the
‘use on roads’ issue, they are just too distant from the core of the statute—
fast-moving cars, motor scooters, and even bicycles.
191. The motorized-wheelchair examples are from ESKRIDGE, supra note 50, at 127–36.
192. Although we address the issues from an intensional perspective, the result would
likely be the same regardless of whether an intensional or extensional approach were used. See
supra Section I.B.1.
May 2021] The Meaning of Sex 1541
MOTORIZED WHEELCHAIR
Fast forward half a century. Motorized wheelchairs have come a long
way, and one nifty new model is the Otto Bock SuperFour motorized wheel-
chair, depicted below. Yes, it is a wheelchair, designed by a leading European
wheelchair manufacturer to allow people with disabilities to venture into un-
even paths and rough terrain—but it also looks like a small car and can travel
fifteen kilometers per hour, about as fast as a Segway but slower than a mo-
tor scooter.193
193. Christopher Snowbeck, All-Terrain Wheelchair Offers Mobility in Rugged Settings,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 13, 2015, 6:30 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2008/09/11/all-
terrain-wheelchair-offers-mobility-in-rugged-settings [https://perma.cc/GRU3-YCLW]; Bar-
bara Jung-Arntz, MOBILE: Autoscooter im Gelände, FOCUS MAGAZIN (Nov. 15, 2013, 11:17
PM), https://www.focus.de/auto/neuheiten/mobile-autoscooter-im-gelaende_aid_339980.html
[https://perma.cc/C54G-HT3E].
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OTTO BOCK SUPERFOUR MOTORIZED WHEELCHAIR
No one in 1964 would have anticipated the Otto Bock SuperFour. Be-
cause of the changed features of the object in question, the original public
meaning of vehicle requires at the very least a fresh analysis before applying
it to the souped-up wheelchair. Unlike the application of the 1964 statute to
a motorized wheelchair, a judge may well find that the Otto Bock SuperFour
is a vehicle due to its larger footprint, its greater similarity to the prototypical
vehicle (e.g., by having a roof), and its enhanced capabilities, which include
the ability to travel on some roads and bike paths. Thus, even though the Ot-
to Bock SuperFour is a motorized wheelchair, its changed features from the
1964 version of a motorized wheelchair may require a different application
of the statute, even when applying the 1964 features of vehicle. Like the Seg-
way example, the original intensional meaning of vehicle remains constant
even though its extensional meaning has evolved over time, even when a cer-
tain instantiation of the concept at issue—motorized wheelchairs—existed at
the time of statutory creation.
Note that we are not arguing that the semantic, features-based analysis is
inevitably the one that would be used by the court. It may be that old statutes
are applied to new circumstances through a process by which the judge or
lawyer reasons by analogy from established applications (perhaps comparing
some of the relevant features of the objects in question) and by reference to
the statutory purpose.194 If, for instance, the purpose of the law was protect-
194 . See supra Section I.B.1.
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ing small children from being run over and if judges had already applied the
law to Segways, the decisionmaker is much more likely to apply it to the Otto
Bock SuperFour. In any case, if intensional original meaning finds the Seg-
way to be a vehicle, the Otto Bock SuperFour is an even easier case. If the
originalist wants to save face by calling it a small car rather than a motorized
wheelchair, well, it’s a free country.
D. New Social, Statutory, or Constitutional Norms
The wheelchair hypotheticals explored above suggest a further dynamic
analysis. Even if the normal linguistic meaning of words and phrases does
not change and even if there are no new things in the world, the application
of legal terms to existing things will change as social, statutory, and constitu-
tional norms evolve. Recall that we did not foreclose the possibility that a no-
vehicles law would have been applied to motorized wheelchairs in 1964, and
such application of the original statute would seem likely to the newer and
more car-like Otto Bock SuperFour. Since 1964, however, norms regarding
wheelchair accommodation have changed. American society today would
not tolerate rules that excluded people with disabilities from enjoying the
park—citizens, police, and even judges would no longer view a motorized
wheelchair as just a vehicle but also as a means to accommodate people who
could not walk around the park. (If the park had rugged terrain, even the
SuperFour might be viewed in this way).
Perhaps surprisingly, dedicated originalists like Justice Scalia conceded
the fact that a statute enacted in 1964 can mean something different today
because of new norms. As the late justice wrote, statutory interpretation is a
“holistic” endeavor, and statutory meaning may change to remain “compati-
ble with the rest of the law.”195 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires pro-
grams receiving federal funds to accommodate people with disabilities.196
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 more broadly prohibits public
accommodations, including parks, from failing to include and accommodate
people with disabilities.197 Accommodation for people with mobility prob-
lems would probably require parks to allow motorized wheelchairs. However
a Scalian judge would have interpreted our no-vehicles law in 1964 when it
was enacted, after 1973 that judge would be more willing to view motorized
wheelchairs as outside the purview of the 1964 law.
Additionally, Justice Scalia and his colleagues aggressively interpreted
statutes to avoid serious constitutional difficulties—typically without making
a firm determination that a broad interpretation would actually have been
195. United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
196. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797b.
197. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
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unconstitutional.198 An interpretation of a no-vehicles law that unreasonably
excluded a class of citizens from enjoying public parks would raise serious
equal protection concerns for many judges, and that would be a further
(normative) reason why the no-vehicles law might mean something different
in 2021 than it meant in 1964.
E. New Meaning for the Regulatory Term
Our hypothetical has illustrated changes to both society (societal dyna-
mism) and social, legal, or constitutional norms (normative dynamism).
Now we consider how the meaning of language itself evolves (linguistic dy-
namism), that is, how the intensional meaning of a term, and thus its exten-
sion, may change over time. Original public meaning, as applied in all three
Bostock opinions, seems to reject or assume away the relevance of linguistic
dynamism to legal interpretation.199 And for a significant number of judges,
the distinction between societal and linguistic dynamism is often crucial to
the resolution of interpretive disputes. We question, however, whether judg-
es can coherently maintain this distinction.200 Certainly, society and lan-
guage are related: as society introduces new things and changes old things,
the extensional meaning of the word or phrase will change; as the new ex-
amples pile up, the intensional meaning will change as well.201 Maintaining a
distinction between the two, as the Bostock dissenters suggest is crucial, re-
quires a consistent and sophisticated methodology of determining the se-
mantic meaning of words. Such efforts must pay close attention to the
generality at which word meanings are framed. If the level of generality is
manipulated by judges (perhaps unconsciously), it becomes difficult to per-
suasively distinguish between an originalist application of public meaning
set at a high level of generality and a finding that a more precise meaning of
the term has evolved over time (as we demonstrate below).
A simple example of linguistic dynamism would be the following. If our
park statute were adopted in 1864 and barred vehicles, it would apply some-
what differently in 1964 to some things that existed in 1864 and had not
changed at all. A good example would be horses. In the nineteenth century,
vehicle, understood as a means of transportation, could have included hors-
es, and for many Americans the prototypical vehicle would have been a
horse or a horse-drawn carriage.202 For instance, as late as 1926, Congress
198 . See, e .g ., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738–39 (2006) (Scalia, J.) (plurality
opinion); ESKRIDGE, supra note 50, at 311–13 nn.9–12; id . at 320.
199 . See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (explaining that the three opinions in
Bostock claimed to follow original-public-meaning principles).
200. At least some forms of societal dynamism are accepted by originalists and thus dis-
tinguished from linguistic dynamism. See supra Section I.B.2.
201 . See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 59–60.
202 . See Andrew Nikiforuk, The Big Shift Last Time: From Horse Dung to Car Smog, THE
TYEE (Mar. 6, 2013), https://thetyee.ca/News/2013/03/06/Horse-Dung-Big-Shift [https://
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enacted a law defining vehicles in the District of Columbia to include “street
cars, draft animals, and beasts of burden.”203 But eventually very few Ameri-
cans got from one place to another on horses; those who do consider the an-
imals pets, not vehicles. Thus, the modal form of transportation in 1864 was
eventually transformed into a show animal. Because of advances in technol-
ogy, the extension of vehicle changed so pervasively that its intensional
meaning changed as well. Linguistic theory tells us this is inevitable, because
language adapts to society, and society is highly dynamic.204
Consider the evolution of vehicle as demonstrated through COHA re-
search.205 The data from the 1960s decade of COHA suggest a main sense (or
meaning) of vehicle which involves the meaning of car or automobile.206 This
is reflected in sets of collocates such as types of vehicles (car(s), automo-
bile(s), bus(es), trucks(s), armored cars, auto, wagon), their parts (motor(s),
engine(s), wheel(s), tires), locations where they are found (road(s), streets,
highways), what they transport (driver(s), passenger, occupants, users, police,
goods) and the economic connections (transport, convoy(s), operating, tariff,
traffic, routes, license/licensed).207 The research thus revealed a prototype of
vehicle with features that seem to be an automobile with an engine, wheels,
and tires that transports at least one person and perhaps other goods (often
for economic reasons and on roads), for which licensing might be re-
quired.208 By the 2000s this picture had diversified.209 There is still a sense
perma.cc/WYP9-ZN3K] (tracing the rise and fall of horses as major modes of transportation).
Indeed, horses would have been more readily identified as vehicles in 1864 than 1764, when
they were prizes limited to wealthy colonists; most people just walked. Id .
203. Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 739, sec. 1, § 2(k), 44 Stat. 812.
204 . See supra note 19.
205. The analysis involved, in a nutshell, a retrieval of vehicle(s) from the 1960s COHA
data (excluding fiction) with a 300 characters context window (772 instances), the identifica-
tion of all 10,557 word types ever in vehicle(s)’s context (those words are called ‘collocates’ in
linguistics), and the computation of a statistical measure of association (the log-likelihood ratio
LLR). See Stefan Th. Gries & Philip Durrant, Analyzing Co-occurrence Data, in A PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 141 (Magali Paquot & Stefan Th. Gries eds., 2021), that
reveals for each word how much it is ‘attracted’ by vehicle(s). Then, we computed for each of
the 10,557 collocates of vehicle(s) how often it occurred with other collocates of vehicle(s) and
performed a hierarchical cluster analysis on all collocates with LLR-scores >50. The data for the
2000s decade of COHA were analyzed in the same way.
206 . See MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 67, at 151 (“[S]ense is the semantic aspect of
meaning—the definitional properties that determine which things are referred to when an ex-
pression is used.”).
207 . See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing the meaning of collocates);
see also ALAN CRUSE, A GLOSSARY OF SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 27 (2006) (explaining that
a collocation is a sequence of words that co-occur more often than would be expected by
chance). Collocations thus refer to the statistically significant co-occurrence of words (rather
than co-occurrence due to chance).
208. There was also a second sense of vehicle that was strongly related to space explora-
tion. Collocate sets included words associated with the Apollo program (Apollo, Saturn, Gemi-
ni, lunar and moon, astronaut(s), docking, (un)manned) and related technology (spacecraft,
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that is compatible with the sense from the 1960s, and it still comes with col-
locate sets regarding the parts of cars. But there are also new collocate sets
relating to environmental issues (hydrogen, carbon, standards, hybrid, pollu-
tion, engine, gas(oline), emissions, energy, reduce, fleet, mileage) and safety
(rollover, collision, accidents, crash, headlights). There is also an increase in
the number of different words for types, adding these to the ones from
above: (midsize, sedan(s), SUVs, sports utility vehicle, pickup, minivan). The
corpus data thus reveal that diversification of vehicle occurred not only in
the types of vehicles that exist but also in what propels the prototypical vehi-
cle: that category evolved to include alternative means of propulsion and
their perceived environmental benefits.
The data also help illustrate that the distinction between societal and
linguistic dynamism can depend on how the interpreter frames the inquiry.
Consider a layperson’s narrative of how the public’s perceptions of vehicle
may have changed since 1964. At the time of enactment of the no-vehicles
provision (or soon thereafter), mechanisms operating on batteries might not
have been included in the prohibition (and hence allowed in the park) be-
cause they were not powered (motored) by an internal-combustion en-
gine. 210 Today, Americans are more likely to understand vehicles as
including a variety of motors, including those powered by electrical motors
satellite(s), booster(s), rocket, missile, radar, orbital/orbiting, module), words that are more var-
ied but clearly related to this semantic group (entry, atmosphere, space, exploration, mission(s),
rendezvous, force, earth), and words that interestingly highlight the connection between space
exploration and military objectives at the time (Russians, MIRV, Titan, ballistic). This second
sense of vehicle might thus be described as ‘a spacecraft suitable for leaving but also reentering
the atmosphere, possibly with the goal of carrying one or more humans as well as other vehi-
cles to land on the moon.’ One conclusion of this research is that an extensional corpus-
linguistics approach may sometimes lead to questionable conclusions. See supra notes 117–127
and accompanying text. For instance, Lee and Mouritsen indicate that “vehicle is never used to
refer to bicycle or airplane in the corpus data.” Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 840. Lee and
Mouritsen argue that “based on its absence from any of our corpus data, we might ask if air-
plane is even a possible sense of vehicle.” Id . at 844. Of course, the proper question is not, as Lee
and Mouritsen frame it, whether “airplane is even a possible sense of vehicle,” since no one is
arguing that ‘vehicle means airplane’; the question is whether airplane can be said to fall within
the extension of vehicle. But Lee and Mouritsen’s narrow search for instances where the word
vehicle is used to refer to an airplane will miss the spacecraft-sense collocates listed above.
When collocates are used in a more nuanced way—using both frequency and association as
diagnostics—‘flying stuff’ is a strong second main sense of vehicle in COHA’s 1960s data.
While this analysis does not prove that an airplane is a vehicle, our results, arrived at with bet-
ter methods and a more nuanced conception of meaning, provide a firmer basis for such a
conclusion.
209 . Cf . BYBEE, supra note 104, at 195 (“There is an interesting tension between the need
for words to be stable in their meaning so that language users understand each other and the
tendency and need to adapt old words to new uses.”).
210. Charles Lafayette Proctor, Internal-Combustion Engine, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA (June
10, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/technology/internal-combustion-engine [https://perma
.cc/YR4C-AKSU].
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rather than gas-fueled motors.211 Hence, the evolution of what we mean by
vehicle makes way for the potential regulation of Segways once they came on
the market in 2001.212
Now consider how a linguist might think about how the concept ‘vehi-
cle’ may have changed since 1964. We will have to get into the weeds a bit
over the following two paragraphs, but please bear with us. Recall that we
question whether the distinction between societal and linguistic dynamism
can be coherently maintained by judges. To illustrate our assertion (and have
the concluding paragraph of this section be compelling), we first need to give a
short description of how a linguist might analyze linguistic changes over time.
The linguist would not necessarily center on vehicle. Virtually everyone
would agree that a car is a vehicle and that car is a far more common term
than vehicle. Both are categories of course, but some category types are more
commonly used than others. In fact, categories can be divided into three lev-
els: the subordinate level, the basic level, and the superordinate level.213 So
for the 1964 statute, vehicle is a superordinate term and car (or automobile)
is a basic-level term and the prototype of ‘vehicle.’214 Things like sedan,
coupe, and station wagon were subordinate terms, which refer to the ‘form
aspect’ of the car. At the time, car implied without question the existence of
an internal-combustion engine. The prototypical car was probably a sedan in
the three-box form.215
In 2021, vehicle is still a superordinate term and car (or automobile) is
still a basic-level term and the prototype of ‘vehicle.’ Certainly, though, the
number of subordinate terms has increased, including things like SUV,
which refer to the form aspect of the car. Also, and more significantly, the
subordinate terms include things like electric car, gas-electric hybrid, and
fuel-cell car. These latter terms refer to the form of propulsion, which is no
longer limited to the internal-combustion engine. What time did to the cate-
gory of ‘car,’ and therefore ‘vehicle,’ is introduce a new family of subordinate
types. Formerly, it was mostly ‘shape’ plus maybe things like ‘what gets
211. We can imagine that in 2064 solar-powered mechanisms could fall under the park
exclusion for vehicles. In fact, the city might have changed its view about the point of the stat-
ute—away from fume control toward safety for older folks and kids in the park.
212 . See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Of course, this narrative is simplified for
the purpose of focusing on language issues. The circumstances of statutory enactment (e.g., the
law was adopted to combat noxious fumes), would undoubtedly influence its application, such
as the lack of a combustion engine being a convenient reason not to include motorized wheel-
chairs in 1964.
213 . See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 48–53.
214. Many other terms would also have basic-level term status, such as motorcycle.
215. Mike Colias, America Has Fallen Out of Love with the Sedan, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25,
2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-has-fallen-out-of-love-with-the-
sedan-1535169698 [https://perma.cc/WTS2-A9ZM].
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transported.’216 In 2021, we also have a family of propulsion-related terms.
The prototype is probably still a sedan in the three-box form, or now an
SUV, with an internal-combustion engine, simply because that’s the most
frequent case and probably unmarked (in the sense that one wouldn’t men-
tion the car’s means of propulsion if it had an internal-combustion en-
gine).217 Nevertheless, the change to the category of ‘car’ percolates up to the
category of ‘vehicle’ because its prototype now has a new structure.
You made it! You now understand that both the layperson and linguist
would recognize that circumstances changed between 1964 and 2021, albeit
at different levels of analysis. As the linguist’s analysis demonstrates, it is
possible to view the changed circumstances as being characterized by lin-
guistic dynamism based on the changed features of car (and therefore vehi-
cle).218 Imagine, though, a more basic, layperson analysis that would view the
features of car (and therefore vehicle) at a higher level of generality. This
analysis views a car as having an ‘engine’ (or, even more generally, a ‘means
of propulsion’). If viewed in this way, the meaning of vehicle has not changed
over time and including a Segway within the statute is instead an example of
societal dynamism.219 (It may also be an example of normative dynamism, as
environmental concerns have changed the way Americans think a car should
be powered.) The originalist position may therefore be more difficult to
maintain than its proponents acknowledge. If originalists concede, as they
must, that the extension of a term may change over time due to societal dy-
namism, they must provide both a normative theory of why that extension
should not also change due to linguistic or normative dynamism and some
coherent methodology for distinguishing among the forms of dynamism.
Neither requirement has been convincingly satisfied thus far. And, as we
216. Thus, if the transportation is primarily of ‘people,’ sedan and coupe, and if it is pri-
marily of ‘goods,’ pick up, truck, etc.
217. In this case, ‘unmarked’ refers to distributional markedness, where “the unmarked
term occurs in a wider range of contexts than the marked term.” CRUSE, supra note 207, at 99.
218. In an important sense, the categorization determination is a probabilistic evaluation.
Thus, a lexical category C does not have definitional structure but has instead a probabilistic
structure in the sense that an item falls under C if it satisfies a sufficient number of properties
encoded by C’s constituents. More precisely, if one considers that a basic level itself has a pro-
totype structure, a class C will be a subcategory of superordinate class S, provided that the pro-
totype for C is sufficiently similar to the prototype for S. See James A. Hampton, Similarity-
Based Categorization: The Development of Prototype Theory, 35 PSYCHOLOGICA BELGICA 103,
105 (1995). Possessing the similarity criteria is thus both necessary and sufficient for category
membership.
219. This latter analysis, where features are viewed at a higher level of generality, may be
more likely to occur when a judge considers the meanings of terms in a much earlier enacted
statute (say in 1964). The judge, perhaps viewing the linguistic issues in normative terms, has
the benefit of seeing how technological innovations have demonstrated that an earlier depic-
tion of the concept is unduly narrow. The judge may then retroactively frame the features in
more general ways. Thus, for the judge, one feature of a car has always been ‘engine’ (or, more
generally, a ‘means of propulsion’), rather than ‘internal-combustion engine.’
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now demonstrate, the three opinions in Bostock suggest that none of the
Court’s originalists has a persuasive theory along these lines.
III. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, EVOLVING LANGUAGE, AND TITLE VII
We conclude our analysis by showing how the evolution of language, so-
ciety, and norms describes and justifies the arc of EEOC and Supreme Court
precedents interpreting Title VII’s bar to sex discrimination, culminating in
Bostock. Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock attempted to elide the
issues of societal, normative, and linguistic dynamism by stipulating, for the
purposes of the opinion, to a definition of sex that limited it to “biological
distinctions between male and female.”220 Doing so had the antiseptic effect
of focusing attention on purely legal issues regarding the scope of the causal
“because of” language and eliminating discussion of more socially controver-
sial issues about the meaning of sex and the evolving status of gay men, lesbi-
ans, and transgender persons.221 (Over)simplifying the interpretive issues in
such a manner, however, raises questions about the coherence of the Court’s
interpretive approach. The Court should have more explicitly recognized the
inescapable social and even normative dynamism implicated in its decision.
For the Court to pretend that it would have interpreted Title VII similarly in
1964 was disingenuous and unnecessary.
We first address the meaning of sex in Title VII and argue that its public
meaning in 1964 was decidedly not limited to ‘biological distinctions be-
tween male and female’ and included what would later be dubbed ‘gender
roles,’ which lower court judges have recently understood when applying Ti-
tle VII to sexual and gender minorities. Sex was a broad, catchall term in
1964, used in circumstances where we would use terms such as gender, sexu-
ality, and sexual orientation. At the same time, the various meanings of sex
in 1964 were more tightly linked than they are today.222 Today, gender is a
commonly used word that reflects women’s increasingly prominent role in
society and serves as a linguistic rejection of the older view that ‘sex as biolo-
gy’ and ‘sex as gender’ are closely linked.
In other words, the intensional meaning of sex (and ‘discriminate be-
cause of sex’) has changed in the last half century—indeed, it changed right
in the middle of the majority opinion! Justice Gorsuch launched his opinion
for the Court with the assumption of sex as biology, full stop.223 He made his
but-for causation argument (i.e., you can’t say gay without saying sex) but
then the opinion went on for another fifteen pages. When Justice Gorsuch
220. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
221 . See id . at 1734.
222. In 1964, at least according to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, dictionaries assumed
that there were just two sexes and that there were widely recognized traits associated with each
sex. Id . at 1789 (Alito, J., dissenting).
223 . Id . at 1739 (majority opinion).
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addressed a hypothetical (the Hannah and Bob scenario, discussed below)
where the employees were discriminated against because they were not fem-
inine or masculine enough, he linguistically shifted from sex as biology to
sex as gender, and he normatively shifted from the natural law assumptions
of sex binarism to the feminist assumption that sex as biology ought not dic-
tate sex as gender.224 In fact, all three justices writing opinions were caught in
a linguistic time warp, where they were reading today’s language back into
1964, which would seem to be quite unoriginalist (indeed, anachronistic).
Justices Alito and Kavanaugh both assailed the majority for confusing sex
and sexual orientation, but in 1964 sexual orientation was not a common
word in the public vocabulary. Gender was not a common word in the public
vocabulary. Why not? Because terms like gender and sexual orientation (and
other terms like sexuality) now denote concepts that once could be and were
typically referred to as sex.
Assume away, as Gorsuch did, the possibility of linguistic dynamism in
Bostock. What about societal dynamism, which originalists readily
acknowledge?225 An important mistake made by all three opinions was the
failure to recognize the legal significance of societal evolution. None of the
opinions viewed as legally significant the status of what the dissenters
dubbed “gays and lesbians” as a new social group that is not transhistoric.226
As a class of people not extant in 1964, gays and lesbians are much like the
Segway or, alternatively, a class that had changed so much that it bore as
much resemblance to the 1964 class (whatever it was) as the Otto Bock Su-
perFour bears to the old-fashioned wheelchair.227 Thus, as we explain below,
one can embrace an original-public-meaning approach to Title VII and still
find that the statute prohibits discrimination against today’s ‘gays and lesbians.’
A. The Meaning of Sex
The linguistic meaning of sex has dramatically changed between 1964
and the present, which may have been part of the reason why the three opin-
ions in Bostock failed to accurately comprehend sex as the term was used
1964. Specifically, sex was a catchall term with a broader meaning in 1964
than the Court’s assumed definition of sex as the biological differences be-
tween men and women (‘sex as biology,’ for short). Specifically, in 1964, sex
included concepts that today we call ‘sex as gender’ and ‘sex as sexuality.’ In-
deed, Justice Alito’s appendix of dictionary definitions of sex was at war with
his claim that sex in 1964 was limited to the biological categories of men and
224 . See infra notes 265–266 and accompanying text.
225 . See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
226. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1764, 1769 (Alito, J., dissenting).
227 . See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
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women. His first listed dictionary was the 1953 print of Webster’s Second.228
This dictionary defines sex to include the following:
• “[o]ne of the two divisions of organisms formed on the distinc-
tion of male and female,” or ‘sex as biology’ (man, woman);
• “[t]he sphere of behavior dominated by the relations between
male and female,” or ‘sex as gender’ (masculine, feminine);
• “the whole sphere of behavior related even indirectly to the sex-
ual functions and embracing all affectionate and pleasure-
seeking conduct,” or ‘sex as sexuality.’229
Other dictionary definitions reported in Justice Alito’s appendix defined
sex to include ‘eunuchs’ and ‘hermaphrodites,’ as well as ‘men and wom-
en.’230 Thus, even if limited to the interpretive methodologies promoted by
the Court and Justice Alito, sex in 1964 could not be limited to sex as biolo-
gy. Far be it from us to rest our analysis on dictionaries, for historical corpus
linguistic research demonstrates both the breadth and the evolution in the
meaning of sex. Consider some of our findings.
1. In the 1960s, Gender and Sexual Orientation Were Uncommon Words
When evaluating word meanings and their evolution, it is often instruc-
tive to consider whether some possible meanings are “generally expressed
using language other than the language in the disputed statute.”231 With Title
VII and sex, the obviously relevant term is gender, which today means sec-
ondary traits traditionally associated with men and women (hence, ‘mascu-
line’ or ‘feminine’ traits).232 In 1964, gender was a word with a long and
mostly obscure history, but it was not a common word in everyday usage,
what Justices Kavanaugh and Alito referred to as “common parlance.”233
And things that might be referred to as gender characteristics in 2021 were
covered by sex in 1964.
228. We have a personal copy of the 1961 print, with the same quoted definitions. Our
references to Webster’s Second are from our 1961 print, which of course is closer in time to
1964.
229. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2296 (2d ed. 1953), as reprinted in
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1784–85 (2020).
230 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1787, 1789 (Alito, J., dissenting).
231. Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpreta-
tion, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 1315 (2017).
232 . Gender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gender
[https://perma.cc/A9D3-JV4S] (defining gender as “the behavior, cultural, or psychological
traits typically associated with one sex”).
233 . Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1772 (Alito, J., dissenting) (analyzing whether terms are within
“common parlance”); id . at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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The 1960s component of COHA returned only 18 relevant matches for
gender.234 All but two instances of gender are from a very specialized source,
Journal from Ellipsia, an avant-garde science fiction novel about genderless
aliens written by a feminist author, who provides several highly unusual uses
of the term.235 This assessment of the rarity of the word gender in the 1960s
can be supported both linguistically and statistically. As for the former, one
can identify words that have the same frequency in the corpus data of that
time period.236 As for the latter, we use a more advanced and precise statisti-
cal analysis of what is called ‘dispersion.’
Linguistically, the following is a list of random words, each one begin-
ning with a different letter of the alphabet, that have the same frequency as
the term gender in the 1960s COHA data (all homogenized to lower case):
avanti, bailing, callas, darien, explication, fightin, garters, hard-headed, idol-
ized, jailing, kayano, leprosy, metromedia, nightgowns, oscillation, pan-
american, ques, rhubarb, sambuco, three-cornered, untamed, vassall, widder,
x2, yaks, and zarzuela. While some of the words seem quite ordinary (night-
gowns, pan-american, and rhubarb, for instance), it is clear that many are ex-
tremely rare words that even highly educated native speakers of English may
have never heard of, let alone used. But frequency of occurrence, while very
easy to compute, is too likely to overestimate a word’s commonness, which is
why the second approach, involving dispersion, is also needed.
Statistically, dispersion quantifies the way a word is distributed in a cor-
pus in a manner that goes beyond frequency. A word X can be distributed
very evenly in a corpus, which means that the chance of seeing X in a ran-
domly chosen part of the corpus (such as a file or a text) is high. Conversely,
X can be distributed very unevenly, which means that the chance of seeing it
in a randomly chosen part of the corpus (such as a file or a text) is very low.
Examples of the former include most function words such as determiners
(the, a), prepositions (of, in), and conjunctions (and, or). Examples of the lat-
ter include highly specialized terms of art (potassium permanganate), rare
proper names, or even typos (such as eparate or commisisoner).
When we applied the notions of frequency and dispersion (DP) to the
1960s decade of COHA, we obtained the results in Figure 1, which illustrates
the relation between word frequency (logged, on the x-axis) and dispersion
(on the y-axis) for the approximately 316,000 different word forms in that
234. This involved a case-insensitive search for the string gender (a methodological over-
view is on file with the Michigan Law Review). In the relevant sense, gender occurs 18 times in
the 1960s part of COHA: gender (15), genders (1), genderless (1), and gendering (1). See CORPUS
HIST. AM. ENG., supra note 99.
235. HORTENSE CALISHER, JOURNAL FROM ELLIPSIA (1965). Calisher was one of the origi-
nal 53 signatories of a 1972 reproductive-freedom campaign in the liberal feminist Ms . maga-
zine. See Barbaralee D. Diamonstein, We Have Had Abortions, MS., Spring 1972, at 34,
https://images.nymag.com/images/2/promotional/11/11/week1/mrs-abortionsb.pdf
236. Note that raw-frequency comparisons, while widespread, are in fact too coarse an
approach. See Appendix B for an account of dispersion, which addresses the issue of frequency.
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decade of COHA.237 On the top left of the plot, we find words that are overall
infrequent and occur in only a single file of the more than 10,100 corpus
files, such as janizaries, bayonetting, and mooniness, whereas the rightmost
words are the kinds of function words discussed in Appendix B.238
FIGURE 1: FREQUENCIES AND DISPERSIONS OF WORDS IN COHA 1960
Words that are more frequent tend to be more evenly dispersed, but the
crucial finding is the dispersion of gender, which is represented by the dot
indicated by the arrow in Figure 1.239 The following is a list of random words
(one beginning with each letter of the alphabet) that have the same disper-
sion as gender in the 1960s COHA data (all homogenized to lower case):
237. The plot represents on the x-axis the frequency of words (logged to the base of 10)
and on the y-axis the DP-values of the same words. Each word is represented by a grey point.
238. Obviously, there is an overall negative correlation, but the crucial aspect to realize is
the extremely wide range of dispersion/y-axis values for certain ranges of frequency/x-axis val-
ues. For example, for word frequencies around 10,000 (i.e., when x ≈ 4x ≈ 4), the DP-/y-axis
values vary extremely between around 0.3 and 0.8 or more, illustrating the big potential mis-
match between frequency and dispersion that most research does not account for.
239. The research assumed that gender includes gender, genders, gendering, gendered, and
genderless.
Frequency (log10) of words in COHA 1960 
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aky., brilliantp250that, caricatured, drambuic, emilythen, five-and-ten-cent,
grittiness, homeroom, invitedher, jamaican-based, kllai, lepage, mlf, nierkusii,
out-but, puses, quibbles, revealedp251by, supra-rational, topologically, unrhe-
torical, vincentdo, wiic-tv, x/2o, yearth, and zautla. While there are somewhat
ordinary words in this list (caricatured or quibbles), it speaks to the rarity of
gender in the 1960s that it is as well dispersed in the data as are text-
processing errors in the corpus like brilliantp250that (which should be bril-
liant that, omitting the extraneous page number). The dispersion of gender
in 1960s American English thus indicates that it was an extremely uncommon
word.240
Similar results obtain for sexual orientation. Data from the 1960s to the
2000s COHA sections indicate that sexual orientation is a fairly infrequent
and very unevenly distributed expression (even when the search is extended
to bi-/hetero-/homosexual). Given the low frequencies of occurrence (162 to-
tal occurrences over 50 years of corpus data), statistical claims need to be
made with caution. All that can be safely said is that the term increased in
usage in three respects: its overall frequency, its distribution across the four
COHA registers (fiction, magazines, news, and nonfiction), and its disper-
sion over time.241 Even in the latest decade studied, the 2000s, we still only
found 70 occurrences in COHA in approximately 30 million words of text. It
may be that usage has increased significantly in the last decade, but it is clear
that sexual orientation was not a common term in 1964.
2. In the 1960s, Sex Was Used in Place of Terms Like Gender and Was
Sometimes Used in Ways that Were Not Binary
The previous Section demonstrated that gender and sexual orientation
were essentially non-words in the 1960s.242 In terms of both frequency and,
more importantly, dispersion, their distribution is on a par with extremely
rare words, typos, and scanning errors. Consider one important and repre-
sentative question raised by the data: if in 1964 one wanted to talk about
240. Why are these results so extreme? All examples of gender in the relevant sense (i.e.,
excluding the ‘grammatical gender’ sense and excluding one example from a Time magazine
article on Title VII) but two were from a single one of more than 10,100 corpus files. In other
words, had Journal from Ellipsia, see supra note 235, published a year after Title VII was enact-
ed, not been sampled, there might not have been a single obvious and countable example in a
twenty-four-million-word corpus covering ten years of American English. CORPUS HIST. AM.
ENG., supra note 99.
241. As measured with Deviation of Proportions. See Appendix B for explanation.
242. By “non-words” we do not mean that the words had never been used but merely
that they were extremely rare in 1964. Cf . Dirk Geeraerts, How Words and Vocabularies
Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WORD 416 (John R. Taylor, ed. 2015) (discussing
the unclear issue of what “sufficient number of users of the language” must use a word in order
for it to be recognized).
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what is referred to as gender today, what lexical choices would one make?243
The corpus data from the 1960s section of COHA offer remarkably clear an-
swers to that question. As we looked at the 1960s concordance data for sex in
COHA, it became obvious that a sizable number of uses of sex and its deriva-
tives were indeed ones that today would involve the word gender today.244 In
fact, it turns out that such uses of sex predate the 1960s. For instance, in 1946
an American Journal of Sociology article entitled Cultural Contradictions and
Sex Roles makes clear from just its abstract that what it refers to as “sex roles”
would today be deemed “gender roles” (all bold emphases in the following
examples are ours):
A study of women college Seniors shows that they commonly face mutually
exclusive expectations of their adult sex roles. In particular, a girl’s family
and her male friends are the agencies through which she meets the incon-
sistency between the ideal of homemaker and that of “career girl.” Some
girls play vacillating roles, corresponding to the pressures of the movement;
all suffer from the uncertainty and insecurity that are the personal manifes-
tations of cultural conflict.245
From the 1960s COHA data, one of the richest sources of examples of
sex as gender is a book excerpt which contains many such instances of sex
and derivatives (we include additional examples from magazines and fiction
below).246 The following are just two examples involving uses of sex, both of
which involve what is today referred to as gender; notice that our second ex-
ample also deploys sex as sexuality.
1. “Although sex-role identification has been discussed in part in the sec-
tion dealing with psychosexual adjustment, it will be given fuller treatment
in this section dealing with identity. Identification is considered either in
general terms as meaning personal identity or as sex-role identification.”247
2. “But the Rorschach tells of his being immature in psychosexual devel-
opment, lacking in sensuality and eroticism and showing some of the ef-
feminate traits of the feminine-passive character.”248
These two examples suggest that psychosexual was used for the semantic sub-
field of sex, which would later become referred to as gender.
243. Conceivably, one could perform a full analysis with various other words, but in the
interests of concision we focus primarily on gender and sexual orientation.
244 . See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 832 (describing “concordance data”).
245. Mirra Komarovsky, Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles, 52 AM. J. SOCIO. 184, 184
(1946).
246. See PERCIVAL M. SYMONDS WITH ARTHUR R. JENSEN, FROM ADOLESCENT TO ADULT
(1961).
247. Id . at 139.
248. Id . at 132.
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In the spirit of taking dispersion into consideration, we do not just note
examples from this one reference. Other sources from other registers/genres
exhibit similar uses, as in (3) through (6), involving what today are discussed
as “gender roles”:
3. “The activities which characterize the nuclear family may be seen
therefore to favour a sexual division of labour and to favour the adoption
by the woman of the family-oriented role, and the performance of this role
would seem to militate against continued employment and to diminish a
woman’s career prospects.”249
4. “The setting is Manhattan’s Upper West Side, the people a middle-
class family. From the beginning, much of the humor revolves around an
inversion of sexual roles. The men, father, son and photographer-fiancé,
are towers of Jello. The women, wife and daughter, are ice picks.”250
5. “But to be truly happy, I think you must both begin to think a little bit
about changing your sexual attitudes, becoming more open, less limited,
abandoning old-fashioned stereotypes of what is manly and what is femi-
nine.”251
6. “[Boys/men] prove their masculinity by sexual prowess. Girls prove
their femininity in other ways, more passive and often independent of their
sex roles. Freud’s term ‘sublimation’ is now out of fashion, but the phe-
nomenon it refers to—a transformation and redirection of sexual energy
into other channels—is very real.”252
Interestingly, in addition to these examples from nonfictional writing,
magazines, and fictional writing, there is another strand of evidence for the
1960s use of sex and derivatives covering what today is gender, and that is
how academic writing on these topics evolved and, over time, influenced
more mainstream or less-specialized public discourse. One kind of dis-
course—that of transexual and transgender—is, in a sense, a microcosm in
which the sex-to-gender evolution can be traced. A 1966 Time Magazine arti-
cle entitled A Body to Match the Mind, for instance, discusses the topics of
“transsexuals” and “transvestites” using sex-as-sexuality terms, as shown in
examples (7) and (8).
7. “Both types of transsexuals are likely to be transvestites, preferring
the clothing of the ‘opposite’ sex. There is no explanation in heredity or
hormones. A possible cause in some cases is that a boy was born when his
mother wanted a girl, and she treated him as a girl.”253
249. C.C. HARRIS, THE FAMILY: AN INTRODUCTION 125 (1969).
250. Satirical Sniper Fire, TIME, Jan. 17, 1969, at 69.
251. GORE VIDAL, MYRA BRECKINRIDGE 158 (1968).
252. Joyce Brothers, On Being a Woman: Women Who Don’t Need Men, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, Nov. 1969, at 52, 54.
253 . A Body to Match the Mind, TIME, Dec. 2, 1966, at 52, 52.
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8. “By adulthood, says Dr. Benjamin, the crossover of emotion and
thought may be so deeply ingrained that ‘true transsexuals feel that they
belong to the other sex, they want to be and function as members of the
opposite sex, not only to appear as such.’ ”254
Today, the above two examples would not represent the preferred ter-
minology. Consider the development of the vocabulary around the T in
LGBTQ. The T is usually considered to mean ‘trans,’ which can stand on its
own but can also be taken to represent either ‘transsexual’ or
‘transgender.’255 But while transsexual is a term that is still in use, today’s
discourse relies more heavily on the broader term transgender because trans-
sexuality may focus more on physical aspects of one’s sex, whereas
transgender focuses on psychological aspects of one’s gender disposition, in-
cluding perceived societal expectations about gender roles.256 Thus, con-
sistent with the above, we find a very similar development for sex and
derivatives and transsexual: a recognition that in the 1960s sex was used so
broadly as to be imprecise for discussion, leading towards an acceptance of
different and more specialized terms such as gender.
In addition, sex was used in such a broad sense in compounds that it
would encompass even sexual orientation. For instance, Kinsey’s Institute for
Sex Research was certainly interested in what is today sexual orientation,257
and the following examples illustrate more uses of sex in compounds:
9. “Obscene publications mock the marriage vow, scorn chastity and fi-
delity, and glorify adultery, fornication, prostitution and unnatural sex re-
lations.”258
10. “I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex. I believe in a
life hereafter. I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices.”259
254 . Id . (quoting HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 13 (1966)).
255. The term transsexual was created in German in 1923, HEIKE BAUER, THE
HIRSCHFELD ARCHIVES: VIOLENCE, DEATH, AND MODERN QUEER CULTURE 171 n.12 (2017),
and then imported into English in 1949, see D.O. Cauldwell, Psychopathia Transexualis,
SEXOLOGY, Dec. 1949, at 274, 274. The term transgender only emerged twenty-two years later.
Stephen Whittle, A Brief History of Transgender Issues, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2010, 6:49 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/jun/02/brief-history-transgender-issues
[https://perma.cc/3D3L-SKNF].
256. See Nova A. Swanstrom, Developing and Implementing a Scale to Assess Attitudes
Regarding Transsexuality (2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina Wil-
mington) (on file with authors).
257. Hallie Lieberman, Desexing the Kinsey Institute, N.Y. REV. (Mar. 20, 2018)
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/20/desexing-the-kinsey-institute [https://perma.cc
/Z478-F68G].
258. IRVING WALLACE, THE SEVEN MINUTES 149 (1969).
259. James Ridgeway, The Snoops: Private Lives and Public Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec.
19, 1964, at 13, 14.
1558 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1503
Pretty clearly, the two examples include “unusual” homosexual practices,
just as the expression sex life in the 1960s would also include homosexual ac-
tivities (as it would today). Thus, sex in compounds frequently replaced sex-
ual orientation, which supports the dictionaries that had by the 1960s
already included the very broad sex-as-sexuality sense.
Given these empirical findings, it is not surprising that dictionaries in
the 1960s would list senses of sex that are much broader than a mere binary
biological-sex, male-female distinction (e.g., sense 2 of the 1953 print of
Webster’s Second).260 In 1964, gender and sexual orientation were uncommon
words, and sex included concepts that today we might refer to as gender and
sexual orientation (as well as other terms like sexuality).261 Since 1964, the
world has changed, and those changes have driven evolution in the English
language. The big change in society, reflected in corpus documents, is the
more prominent role assumed by women, which has driven the rise of a dis-
course about gender and about sexuality, gender, and the law. Joan Wallach
Scott’s classic 1986 paper, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,
gave a normative edge to what was occurring in the English language: sex as
biology was being contrasted with gender as social role, and the latter was a
source of intense critique by regular people as well as academics.262 In fact, as
revealed in COHA, gender was becoming a substantially more frequently
used term over time. It was becoming more frequent in simple absolute
terms (measured as frequency per million words), in comprehensive relative
terms (measured as how many words are more frequent than gender), and in
its dispersion throughout the corpus.263 During the same time, sex did not
change much in terms of frequency or dispersion.264
3. The Meaning of Sex in Bostock
The fascinating evolution of American society and language described
above was substantially lost on the authors of the Bostock opinions. Justice
Alito cited the definition of sex from six leading dictionaries, which revealed
a great variety of meanings in the 1960s.265 For example, the American Herit-
age Dictionary (1969) defined sex to include “the condition or character of
being male or female”; “the physiological, functional, and psychological dif-
ferences that distinguish the male and the female”; “the sexual urge or in-
260. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2293 (2d ed. 1953). What should be
surprising is that Justice Alito’s dissent managed to overlook that fact.
261. See supra notes 228–262 and accompanying text.
262 . See Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIST.
REV. 1053 (1986).
263 . See Gries, supra note 129.
264 . Id . at 127 fig.3.
265. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1784–89 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (list-
ing full definitions of “sex” in dictionaries in use in the 1960s).
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stinct as it manifests itself in behavior; and “sexual intercourse.”266 Yet he
and Justice Thomas boiled it down to sex as biology, full stop. They just
could not see (or chose not to see) the variety in meanings revealed by the
dictionaries they consulted. But they were onto something. When they in-
sisted that sex was limited to biology, they were actually arguing that sex was
biological and binary (two sexes) and that everything about sex revolved
around one’s identity as a man or as a woman. Thus, their reading was pre-
scriptive as much as descriptive: they were invoking dictionaries to claim
that, in 1964, ordinary Americans would have believed that everyone was bi-
ologically a man or a woman and that their gender and sexuality matched
their biology—masculine men inserting penises into feminine women.
Justice Gorsuch went along with the dissenters’ poorly articulated un-
derstanding of sex as a static term—but his opinion integrated the linguistic
pluralism in Justice Alito’s dictionaries with the modern normative under-
standing of gender pioneered in public law by Justice Ginsburg. Responding
to the employers’ argument that antigay discrimination treats gay men and
gay women the same and so is not sex discrimination, Gorsuch opined that
an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is insufficiently fem-
inine and also fires a man, Bob, for being insufficiently masculine may treat
men and women as groups more or less equally. But in both cases the em-
ployer fires an individual in part because of sex. Instead of avoiding Title
VII exposure, this employer doubles it.267
At this point in his opinion, Gorsuch was importing sex as gender and
‘gender’ as disaggregated from ‘biology’ into the analysis—a move made
clear when several pages later he said that “just as an employer who fires
both Hannah and Bob for failing to fulfill traditional sex stereotypes doubles
rather than eliminates Title VII liability, an employer who fires both Hannah
and Bob for being gay or transgender does the same.”268 Likewise, the major-
ity’s discussion of the Court’s Title VII precedents relied on sex as gender as
much as sex as biology, and at the end of the opinion Gorsuch lumped to-
gether all sorts of discriminations he and his colleagues believed were ‘be-
cause of sex’: firing based on “sexual stereotypes”; firing “men who do not
behave in a sufficiently masculine way around the office”; firing “women
who are attracted to women, or persons identified at birth as women who
later identify as men,” and so forth.269
As the foregoing examples illustrate, Gorsuch and the majority differed
from Alito and the dissenters not only by taking an intensional rather than
extensional approach to public meaning but by (implicitly) liberating the in-
266 . Id . at 1789 (cleaned up) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1187 (William Morris ed., 1969)).
267 . Id . at 1741 (majority opinion).
268 . Id . at 1742–43.
269 . Id . at 1749.
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tensional meaning of sex from the linguistic and normative tyranny of the
binary sex norm. In the world of the majority, there are more than two bio-
logical sexes, people do not adhere to the gender roles associated with their
biological sexes, folks abandon or equivocate their sex at birth, and adults
who cannot procreate together are now married everywhere in the country.
Unfortunately, the Court obscured what it was doing behind a cloud of
originalist rhetoric. In our view, there is no escape from the fact that the ma-
jority justices were updating Title VII’s language to reflect feminist norms
and language use. Notwithstanding their own anachronisms, the dissenters
had a legitimate beef with the majority opinion, and they had a pretty good
intensional case for their views based upon 1964 norms even if not 1964
words. But, as we now demonstrate, the dissenters fell into a deeper language
trap that revealed their historical analysis to be anachronistic.
B. Sex and Societal Dynamism
Despite evidence of a broad public meaning of sex as a general matter in
1964, the best reading of the Alito dissent is the claim that sex was a norma-
tive word and that the consensus norm was that sex as gender and sex as
sexuality had to flow from the man–woman binary entrenched in that era’s
assumptions about sex as biology. Thus, the dissenters probably believe that
even if sex is (properly) understood as a broad term in 1964, only concep-
tions of sex that are considered by society to be nondeviant (or perhaps non-
criminal) might be included within its scope. Suppose, for instance, that
Justice Alito had argued something like the following:
Yes, sex in the 1960s was a very broad term, and a term that included what
we would call gender and sexual orientation today, but sex as a term in our
language, and especially within the context of Title VII, emphasized the
man–woman biological binary and especially left no space for deviations of
the sort raised by the plaintiffs in Bostock (two gay men and a transgender
woman).
Such a formulation would have integrated Alito’s what-did-sex-mean argu-
ment with his the-gays-were-criminals-and-deviants argument. 270 Most
members of the public in 1964 could not have imagined having people in the
workplace who violated the powerful binary sex norm—whether they were
“homosexuals” or “transsexuals” (to use 1960s terms).
Thus, the Alito argument might be that the ‘nondeviant’ feature is an as-
pect of the intensional meaning of sex in Title VII. This claim has some larg-
er constitutional problems, but set those aside for now. Like the no-vehicles-
in-the-park hypothetical, the extension of the statute will undoubtedly
evolve over time due to societal dynamism.271 As we demonstrate below, the
270 . See id . at 1769–73 (Alito, J., dissenting). And the formulation would give Alito’s dis-
sent a depth that it needed to avoid suspicions of gay bashing.
271 . See supra Part II.
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significant social dynamism associated with lesbians and gay men (as well as
transgender persons) is sufficient to bring them within the protection of Ti-
tle VII, even if a contrary conclusion would have been made about a differ-
ent but related social group in 1964.
Drawing from a richly researched survey of the pre- and post-enactment
legislative history, precedents, governmental practice, and social context,
Alito’s dissenting opinion argued that no one in 1964 would have interpret-
ed “discriminate because of sex” to include sexual orientation.272 It was a re-
markable opinion because its factual account was both historically well-
documented and wildly anachronistic, and because its legal account was
compelling to those willing to close their eyes to the moral and constitutional
squalor of the history thus presented. As a matter of political philosophy,
Sam Alito was making the same kind of mistake Roger Taney made in Dred
Scott v . Sandford: because free Black persons were (allegedly) treated as de-
graded and unworthy of citizenship in many states at the founding, Taney
read the Constitution to mean that no person of African heritage could ever
be a citizen for purposes of Article III’s diversity jurisdiction.273 Similarly, the
Bostock dissenters focused on the negative cultural depictions of a group
they called ‘gays and lesbians’ in the 1960s but did so unmindful of the mas-
sive social and normative changes that have since occurred.
There is also a simple descriptive answer to the dissenters: in 1964, there
was no social group of ‘gays and lesbians’ that could have been considered
for protection, and there was a coherent theory for justified discrimination,
resting not on ‘sexual orientation’ but on predation and psychopathy, that
would have rendered Title VII irrelevant for the social group that was pub-
licly recognized in 1964. Examine the 1964 language evidence in greater de-
tail than the dissenters thought to do. Neither legislators nor the population
at large would have recognized the term gay men and lesbians, nor would the
notion of discrimination because of sexual orientation have been intelligible
to them. Although we are quite critical of the judiciary’s reliance on diction-
ary definitions, it is worthwhile to note that Webster’s Second did not have an
entry for sexual orientation, and defined gay as “merry” or “gleeful” or “li-
centious.”274 Surprisingly, there was no entry for homosexual, though lesbian
was defined as a “homosexual woman.”275 But there were a lot of entries for
perversion, sexual perversion, invert, and pervert.276 Sexual perversion was de-
272 . See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
273 . See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410–16 (1857) (enslaved party),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Brief of William N.
Eskridge Jr. & Andrew M. Koppelman as Amici Curiae in Support of Emps. at 17–18, Bostock,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (No. 17-1618).
274 . WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 184, at 1040.
275 . Id . at 1418.
276 . E .g ., id . at 1305 (defining “invert”); id . at 1830 (defining “perversion” as “malad-
justment of the sexual life”); id . (defining “pervert”).
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fined as “[a]n abnormality or eccentricity of sexual desire and behavior, as
fetishism, masochism, or sadism.”277
Lengthy historical examinations have been made of the systematic gov-
ernment campaign, conducted in the 1940s through the 1960s, that was de-
signed to stigmatize, destroy, and (at the very least) drive from public
visibility people labeled as “homosexuals and other sex perverts,” persons
“afflicted with psychopathic personality,” “degenerates,” and “inverts,” to
identify the most popular legal terms.278 Those accounts reported not a sin-
gle federal statute, executive order, state law or municipal ordinance, or
court opinion before 1964 that used the term gay men or gay men and lesbi-
ans or even sexual orientation.279 That social class, linked by the Bostock dis-
senters to original public meaning, would have ‘meant’ nothing to the
‘public’ as ‘originally’ constituted in 1964. This is a textbook example of
anachronism.
COHA data from the 1960s support our hypothesis that the social group
described by the dissenting justices was ‘sex criminals and predators’ and de-
cidedly not ‘gay men and lesbians’ as we understand that class today. In
more than 10,100 text sources of COHA data for the 1960s, there were few, if
any, references to ‘gay’ men as ‘homosexuals’ and a lot of references to ‘gay’
as ‘joyful.’ In fact, COHA searches reveal virtually no mentions of ‘homosex-
ual orientation’ in the 1960s.280 The class that ordinary speakers would have
associated Mr. Bostock with would have been ‘homosexuals and other sex
perverts,’ and the classification they would have invoked would have been
‘sex deviance’ or ‘sex perversion.’ (Notice the use of sex as sexuality.) This
terminology was used in both legislative and executive documents and was
widespread in common parlance. Employers pervasively refused to hire ‘sex
perverts,’ and no one—not a single example that we can find in government
documents, in COHA searches, or elsewhere—ever said this was discrimina-
tion because of sexual orientation because (1) no one used the term sexual
orientation and few could have guessed at its meaning as we understand it
today, (2) no one would have considered purges of ‘perverts’ and other sex
criminals to have been ‘discrimination,’ and (3) everyone would have felt it
their moral and even legal duty to expunge predators from their firms.281
277 . Id . at 2297.
278 . See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 68–70 (1999); ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 90, 156–57.
279 . See ESKRIDGE, supra note 278; ESKRIDGE, supra note 7.
280. A query for “homosexual orientation” in the 1960s, CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., supra
note 99, reveals two sources. One (with three mentions) is an academic research monograph,
SYMONDS WITH JENSEN, supra note 246; the other (with one mention) is a Time Magazine arti-
cle, Homosexuality: Coming to Terms, TIME (Oct. 24, 1969), http://content.time.com/time
/subscriber/article/0,33009,901599,00.html [https://perma.cc/KLQ8-F9HY].
281 . See ESKRIDGE, supra note 278, at 70. Certainly, some employers looked the other
way, but employers in general would not have admitted to employing ‘homosexuals and other
sex perverts.’ See id . at 98–99.
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Our corpus search discovered that the terms associated with ‘homosexu-
als’ in the 1950s and 1960s include words like mentally ill, predatory, child
molesters, psychopathic, prisons, police, and so forth. A corpus search for ho-
mosexual in COHA, 1950s and 1960s (combined), identified all the collo-
cates (associated terms), and their association to homosexual (LLR) was
computed. Among many others, the following collocates (and collocate
groupings) can be found:
• psychoanalytically, psychiatrists, mental, clinical
• deviants, deviation, unnatural, perverts, normality, acceptable
• venereal, impairment
• adultery, hostility, suffering, withheld, demeaning, risks
• crime, obscene.282
The result of that analysis suggests that the representation of ‘homosex-
uals’ in the 1960s was indeed much more hostile than that of sexuality in
general in the 1960s. In 1964, the word homosexuals was not associated with
families, employees, reliability, collegiality, and other traits considered nec-
essary or desirable by employers. An employer would not have seen itself as
‘discriminating’ because of the applicant’s sex or even his dating history
when it declined to hire the ‘homosexual.’ The employer would have filtered
the ‘homosexual’ job applicant through the lens of its associated nouns,
namely, psychopath, presumptive criminal, predator, or child molester.
Today, neither statutes nor legislative, judicial, or administrative docu-
ments would refer to ‘homosexuals and other sex perverts.’ The term has vir-
tually disappeared in public discourse such as newspapers, media discussion,
and official records—even the term homosexuals is being superseded by ‘gay
men and lesbians’ (or lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, etc.). An exploration of
COHA from the 2000s along the lines above shows that the collocates of ho-
mosexual are much less colored by the above negative or evaluative connota-
tion: perversion(s) or pervert(s) are not attested at all, words like deviant or
unnatural are attested but are extremely rare, and even roots such as perv are
used in more neutral and less degrading ways.283 None of these terms exhib-
its the same kinds of high co-occurrence frequencies and association to ho-
mosexual in the 2000s.
Moreover, the term gay men and lesbians was entirely absent from pub-
lic discourse in 1964. A COHA search for the 1950s and 1960s reveals some
mention of lesbians, but no mention in public sources for gay men or for gay
282. These groupings are our heuristic classification based off a query for homosexuals in
the 1950s and 1960s. CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., supra note 99.
283. CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., supra note 99 (query for homosexuals in the 2000s).
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men and lesbians as a social group.284 In fact, seventy-three instances of les-
bian, lesbians, or lesbianism, were found but zero instances of gay men. ‘Gay
men and lesbians’ are thus an entirely new class of people, as distant from
the old group (‘homosexuals and other sex perverts’) as today’s class of vehi-
cles are from those of the 18th century. Equally anachronistic is to apply
‘sexual orientation’ discrimination to 1960s discourse. Sexual orientation is
not a term that was used in public documents in 1964, and our COHA
searches found no coherent understanding of the concept.
Even if the relevance of linguistic dynamism is disputed, the fundamen-
tal societal dynamism associated with the status of gays and lesbians means
that the interpreter cannot coherently find an original public meaning for
application of the 1964 law to a social group that did not exist in 1964. One
reason the 1964 social group had disappeared was normative and constitu-
tional: consenting adults enjoying sex with persons of the same sex in private
places could not be criminals after Lawrence v . Texas.285 Well before Law-
rence, medical professionals had renounced the view that ‘homosexuality’
was a mental illness, such as a ‘psychopathic’ condition.286 As with our hypo-
thetical no-vehicles-in-the-park statute, this employment super-statute is
necessarily applied to new circumstances and in light of new norms over a
long period of time. Even if a distantly related group of despised Americans
were considered enemies of the people and presumptively unemployable in
1964, societal dynamism may fundamentally change the objects of interpre-
tation, and thus statutory application, even if it is assumed that linguistic dy-
namism is not also present. Arguments for exclusion that appeal to the
original public meaning of the text, and what the public would have thought
in 1964, are thus unresponsive and unpersuasive.
C. The Evolution of Sex and the Dynamic Meaning of Title VII
Thus far, our account of language, interpretation, and Title VII has fo-
cused generally on issues of originalism, public meaning, and dynamic in-
terpretation, rather than attempting to show that our analysis and
conclusions follow from the Court’s Title VII precedents. Yet our account
helps explain Title VII’s statutory (including precedential) history, which il-
lustrates the linguistic dynamism associated with sex and the concomitant
societal and normative dynamism associated with the rise of gays and lesbi-
ans as a respectable social group. This evolution of language, society, and
norms describes and justifies the arc of EEOC and Supreme Court prece-
284. CORPUS HIST. AM. ENG., supra note 99 (query for lesbians, gay men, or gay men and
lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s).
285 . See 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
286. Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 565, 565
(2015) (“In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) removed the diagnosis of ‘ho-
mosexuality’ from the second edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM).”).
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dents interpreting Title VII’s bar to sex discrimination. In turn, the arc of
EEOC and Supreme Court precedents interpreting Title VII indicate that the
Court cannot, consistent with stare decisis and the rule of law, pretend to re-
turn to a 1964 view of the meaning of Title VII. By ignoring unmistakable
societal and normative dynamism, and by failing to acknowledge that Title
VII would not have been interpreted in the same way in 1964, the Court
missed a chance to offer a coherent public meaning approach to how super-
statutes like Title VII evolve.
1. Linguistic Dynamism and Title VII’s Evolution
The Supreme Court’s first Title VII sex-discrimination case, Phillips v .
Martin Marietta Corp .,287 illustrates how ‘discriminate because of sex’ was
understood broadly as early as 1971. The Court unanimously overturned an
employer policy discouraging employment of women (but not men) with
preschool-age children.288 The employer had argued that it did not violate
the law: its policy was based upon experience where women (but not men)
with children tended to miss work because they handled the bulk of child-
care responsibilities.289 Title VII, the Court replied, requires that persons of
like qualifications be given employment opportunities “irrespective of their
sex,”290 understood broadly: the employer was not discriminating exclusively
based upon sex as biology (75–80 percent of those hired were women), but
was primarily discriminating because of sex as gender (stereotyping): women
like Ida Phillips would probably have shirked work duties to take care of the
kids, as the employer assumed they should have done.291 Congress was aware
of Martin Marietta when it expanded Title VII to state and local government
employers (such as Clayton County) in its 1972 Amendments.292 Congres-
sional deliberations reaffirmed Title VII’s commitment to discouraging job
discrimination based upon what we would call ‘gender stereotyping’ but
which Justice Marshall termed “stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.”293
287. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
288 . Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544.
289. Brief for Respondent at 20–28, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971) (No. 73-1058).
290 . Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544 (per curiam).
291 . Id . at 544–45 (Marshall, J., concurring) (relying on EEOC guidance).
292. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681–1688); see H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 5 n.1 (1971) (referring to
Martin Marietta to confirm that courts are taking workplace sex discrimination seriously). Six
years later Congress overrode the Court when it declined to view pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion as “discriminat[ion] because of sex.” Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e–2).
293. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. at 544–45 (Marshall, J., concurring) (relying on EEOC
guidance); H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 30.
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By the 1970s, not only was sex as gender taking on an important role in
public discourse and critique, but ‘homosexuals’ were coming out of the
closet, rejecting social stereotypes and icky medical names, and were claim-
ing a new identity as ‘gay and lesbian’ persons. The fresh name did not per-
suade many Americans to like this new group, but ‘gay men and lesbians’
were salient in ways that mattered. One reason they mattered was that wom-
en’s voices were also raising questions about sex as gender and sex as sexuali-
ty, and those questions came together with claims of gay people in a prema-
premature constitutional moment. The same Congress that enacted the 1972
Amendments also passed the Equal Rights Amendment, which would have
barred governmental discrimination “on account of sex.”294 In 1970, Profes-
sor Paul Freund told Congress that, by analogy to Loving v . Virginia, the dif-
ferent-race marriage case, the ERA would bar states from discriminating
against same-sex couples in their marriage laws.295 In 1972, the nation’s lead-
ing constitutional scholars agreed that the ERA would require state tolera-
tion of homosexuality and homosexual relationships.296 This argument did
not prevent Congress from passing the ERA, but it was persuasive to many
state legislators and voters, who prevented the ratification of the ERA.297 The
cartoon below captured, better than any dictionary could, the connections
made by Mrs. Schlafly and other social conservatives among sex as biology
(women and men), sex as gender role (a child’s need for women as mothers),
and sex as sexuality (abortion on demand and “homosexual marriages”).298
294. Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, Pub. L. No. 92-607, 86
Stat. 1523 (1972).
295. William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Ar-
gument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 349 (2017).
296 . See Equal Rights 1970: Hearing on S .J . Res . 61 and S .J . Res . 231 Before the S . Comm .
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1970).
297. Eskridge, supra note 295, at 350.
298. Gillian Frank, Phyllis Schlafly’s Legacy of Anti-gay Activism, SLATE (Sept. 6, 2016,
5:52 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/09/phyllis-schlaflys-legacy-of-anti-gay-
activism.html [https://perma.cc/P9U8-RPNU].
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The foregoing analysis provides important linguistic context for the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v . Hopkins299 that an employer
can ‘discriminate because of sex’ by demanding that employees conform to
“sex stereotyping,” or conformity to gendered expectations (e.g., the employ-
er’s expectation that Ann Hopkins needed to act more “feminine” in order to
be promoted).300 “In forbidding employers to discriminate against individu-
als because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”301 In
1991, Congress responded to the Court’s conservative approach to the bur-
den of proof in Hopkins with an override on that issue but with an implicit
consensus agreement that the Court had been right to hold that “evidence of
sex stereotyping is sufficient to prove gender discrimination.”302
The evolution of Americans’ language about sex seems to have proceed-
ed in tandem with the evolution of the justices’ interpretations of Title VII,
immediately ratified and expanded by congressional amendments. In 1979,
Catherine MacKinnon published Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A
Case of Sex Discrimination, and a year later the EEOC adopted her sexual
harassment guidelines.303 In 1986, the Supreme Court agreed with the EEOC
that ‘discrimination because of sex’ includes sexual harassment, and Con-
gress implicitly ratified that broad understanding in its 1991 amendments.304
An interesting capstone was Justice Scalia’s opinion in Oncale v . Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc .305 Joseph Oncale had been subjected to repeat-
ed episodes of male-on-male harassment of a (homo)sexual nature.306 The
lower court held that homosexual harassment fell outside the ambit of Title
VII, which Oncale challenged as unsupported by Title VII’s text (i.e., “dis-
criminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex.”).307 Sundowner re-
299. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
300 . Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235, 244–45(plurality opinion); id . at 266 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring). For an excellent analysis, see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
L.J. 1 (1995).
301. City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978),
quoted and relied on in Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion).
302. H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, pt. 1, at 29 n.17 (1990).
303. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980),
adopting the proposals set forth in CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
304 . See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998) (holding that the
Court’s sexual harassment decision in Meritor Sav . Bank v . Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), was
entitled to super-strong stare decisis because the 1991 Amendments “conspicuous[ly]” left it in
place, suggesting that Congress agreed with the Court about “the proper allocation of the costs
of harassment”).
305. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
306 . Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
307. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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sponded that Oncale’s interpretation “would expand Title VII beyond its
language and legislative purpose by conflating sex discrimination with sexual
orientation discrimination.”308 (By the 1990s, sexual orientation was on its
way to becoming a widely known term, and some jurisdictions had already
barred ‘discrimination because of sexual orientation.’309) Sundowner demon-
strated that Congress had repeatedly declined to enact proposals to protect
against ‘sexual orientation’ discrimination and harassment in the workplace;
indeed, such a proposal was rejected on the floor of the Senate in 1996.310
A unanimous Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the text or
structure of Title VII that precluded relief for same-sex workplace harass-
ment and remanded the case to the lower courts to allow the plaintiff to
make his case.311 Justice Scalia provided some evidentiary routes available to
Mr. Oncale on remand, which also illuminate what ‘discriminate because of
sex’ might mean.312 Thus, the complainant might offer “direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
mixed-sex workplace.”313 Oncale presumably could have argued that a fe-
male employee complaining to the company that she was being sexually
hazed and assaulted would have been taken seriously, while his complaints
of male-on-male sexual abuse had not been (“boys will be boys”).314 If On-
cale had made this kind of showing, he would have established that the com-
pany was more intolerant of, and willing to remedy, ‘heterosexual’ assaults
(men on a woman) than ‘homosexual’ assaults (men on a man).315 After
1998, employer tolerance of ‘homosexual’ abuse was actionable under Title
VII, as interpreted in Oncale. Justice Scalia offered another route toward a
finding of ‘discriminat[ion] because of sex’:
A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks
as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be
308. Brief for Respondents, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 634147, at *5.
309 . See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1831–32 & nn.7–8 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (listing state statutes and executive orders barring job discrimination because of
sexual orientation).
310. Brief for Respondents, supra note 308, at *12. See generally supra note 282 and ac-
companying text.
311 . Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75, 82.
312 . Id . at 81–82.
313 . Id . at 80–81.
314 . See Brief for Petitioner, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 458826, at *4–6.
Long a justification for male sexual assault against women, “boys will be boys” is a justification
for (homo)sexual hazing by purported “straight” males against gay males, effeminate males, or
male newcomers to the workplace.
315. Oncale represented himself as straight. Should his case have come out differently if
Oncale were gay? Surely not, in light of the avoidance canon, which provides that statutes
should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional difficulties. See Fish, supra note 63, at
1275.
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experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the
office.316
While the late justice was not aware of the sexual complexities of coach-
jock butt-smacking, he was recognizing the realities of the office as a sexual
minefield. Note that Scalia included male as well as female secretaries. If the
coach smacks the buttocks of his male secretary and thereby creates a hostile
environment for him, we do not see why the secretary’s or the coach’s sexual
orientation should make a difference, nor did the Scalia opinion. Indeed, if
the coach knows that he is not supposed to smack the buttocks of his female
secretary but feels free to manhandle the rear end of his male secretary, this
conduct ought to be a Title VII violation—regardless of the coach’s or the
secretary’s sexual orientation. The key inquiry is whether the touching up-
ends the workplace because it is sex-based and unwelcome. The male secre-
tary may consider the buttocks-smacking unwelcome because it is
demeaning or effeminizing, because it is homosexually aggressive, or because
it is homophobic—or some combination of all three perceptions.
Reflecting social and linguistic developments in the preceding two dec-
ades, Hopkins and Oncale represent the Supreme Court’s application of the
broad statutory language to situations where gender-benders and homosex-
ual touching were front and center. During the same period, openly lesbian
and gay persons, joined by bisexual and transgender persons in the course of
the 1990s, were flourishing in America. These were citizens no longer
ashamed of their sexual and gender orientations, no longer considered psy-
chopathic or even mentally ill by doctors (indeed, ‘homophobia’ was consid-
ered a mental illness), and no longer alone cowering in their closets.317 They
had families, children, houses, and jobs. To be sure, they were still subject to
prejudice and stereotyping: most Americans considered them strange, some
hated them, and a few were obsessed by a group they still considered ‘homo-
sexuals and other sex perverts.’
Gay people were still outlaws in almost half the states when Oncale was
decided—and in many states consensual oral and anal sex was only a crime if
accomplished between persons of the same sex. The Texas Homosexual
Conduct Law was typical: it (to this day) criminalizes “deviate sexual inter-
course with another individual of the same sex.”318 In Lawrence v . Texas,319
the Court rendered this law unenforceable as inconsistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment. Although the Court treated the statute as one that per-
316 . Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
317 . See ESKRIDGE, supra note 278, at 132–37 (discussing gay people being absolved of
psychopathic personalities by medical profession in 1970s); ESKRIDGE, supra note 7, at 265–69
(discussing gay people streaming out of closets after Bowers and increasingly accepted by other
Americans in the 1990s).
318. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (2019).
319. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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vasively harmed “homosexual persons,” the statutory text said nothing about
sexual orientation and, instead, rested upon a distinction “between the sexes
insofar as concerns the partner with whom the sexual acts are performed:
men can violate the law only with other men, and women only with other
women.”320 The Court’s own rhetoric and reasoning prompted the logic of
the gay plaintiffs’ challenges in Bostock: you can’t say gay without saying sex,
in all its senses!
After Lawrence, gay and lesbian Americans could no longer be treated as
presumptive outlaws, and medical science had cleared them of mental ill-
ness. Because gay Americans were normal citizens by the 1990s but also sub-
ject to ongoing prejudice, a new wave of laws protected against ‘sexual
orientation’ discrimination, the first federal law coming the same year as On-
cale.321 At the same time, the T was being added to LGBT; in the new millen-
nium trans Americans were also recognized as decent, normal people yet
subject to prejudice.322 As a result, federal statutes enacted during the Obama
Administration added gender identity as well as sexual orientation to stat-
utes that already barred discrimination because of sex.323 While at least some
of the Bostock justices thought that sex, sexual orientation, and gender iden-
tity are separate grounds for antidiscrimination protection,324 we have em-
pirically demonstrated that this was not the case: once ‘homosexuals and
other sex perverts’ vanished as a linguistic and social class and a new class of
‘lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender persons’ was normalized, it
also became politically possible to talk about ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender
identity’ discrimination. All these forms of discrimination depended on soci-
ety’s (and its language’s) rejection of the Alito-Thomas assumption that gen-
der role and sexuality are normatively determined by one’s biological sex.
2. “Unexpected” Interpretations and Normative Dynamism
Notwithstanding our demonstration of societal and linguistic dyna-
mism, illustrated and entrenched into law by the evolving Title VII prece-
dents, the Bostock Court insisted on its originalist bona fides: its
interpretation would not have been “totally unexpected” in 1964, and “the
limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no reason to ignore the law’s de-
320 . Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 575; id . at 599–600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 486(e)(1)(A), 112
Stat. 1581, 1743.
322. Jonathan Capehart, Time to Talk About the T in LGBT, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014,
4:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/06/02/time-to-talk-
about-the-t-in-lgbt [https://perma.cc/RG95-GSP2].
323. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 3(b)(4),
127 Stat. 54, 61; Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
111-84, §§ 4704(a)(1)(C), 4707(a), 123 Stat. 2835, 2837, 2838 (2009) (codified at 34 U.S.C.
§ 10101).
324 . See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1777–78 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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mands.”325 Gorsuch’s majority opinion thus implied that the Court would
have decided the interpretive issues the same way in 1964, but this faces a
mountain of contrary evidence supplied by the dissenting opinions.326 The
incongruity of the Court’s position mobilizes Judge Posner’s concerns, ex-
pressed in his concurring opinion in Hively v . Ivy Tech Community College,
regarding judicial efforts to interpret Title VII to protect gay men and lesbi-
ans without acknowledging interpretive dynamism in some way.327 That is,
“an explanation is needed for how 53 years later the meaning of the statute
has changed and the word ‘sex’ in it now connotes both gender and sexual
orientation.”328 According to Posner, “[w]e understand the words of Title
VII differently not because we’re smarter than the statute’s framers and rati-
fiers but because we live in a different era, a different culture.”329 Given that
“[h]omosexuality” today is widely regarded “as normal,” “[a] broader under-
standing of the word ‘sex’ in Title VII than the original understanding is thus
required.”330
Judge Posner’s response to judicial denials of interpretive dynamism in
the interpretation of Title VII raises the issue of how normative commit-
ments shape language meaning and its application. Judge Posner is correct in
suggesting that normative commitments influence how language is under-
stood and used by individuals and speech communities.331 Thus, the best
reading of Alito’s dissent in Bostock is not that sex in 1964 meant just biolog-
ical sex, but that the public assumed or believed that sex as biology dictated
what was appropriate for sex as gender role and sex as sexuality and that
these beliefs were so central to Congress’s adoption of Title VII as to require
a congressional amendment along the same lines as statutory amendments
adding ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ to statutes during the
Obama Administration.332 Our problem with this reading is that it engrafts
onto Title VII assumptions acceptable in 1964 but unconstitutional today.
Recall the Dred Scott problem, based on the Supreme Court opinion holding
that free African Americans could never be citizens because the original pub-
lic meaning of Article III had to take account of the pervasively racist laws of
1789, which treated Black people as nonpersons.333 As we argued in a Bos-
tock amicus brief, Dred Scott was not only constitutionally wrong in 1857,
325 . Id . at 1737, 1751 (majority opinion).
326. Justice Alito, understandably, viewed the Court’s assertion as disingenuous. See id .
at 1773 (Alito, J., dissenting).
327. 853 F.3d 339, 352–53 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., concurring).
328 . Hively, 853 F.3d at 353.
329 . Id. at 357.
330 . Id . at 353–55.
331 . See supra note 19 (describing the different ways in which language evolves).
332 . See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
333 . See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857) (enslaved party), su-
perseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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but it is the star of the constitutional anticanon. In our view, its methodology
is no more persuasive to subtract rights from gay people than it was to do
that to Black people.334
The Dred Scott argument, essentially, is that courts should enforce ex-
tant norms at the time of statutory or constitutional enactment as part of the
meaning of the text. Consider how such an argument fits into the interpre-
tive theories we have discussed. One way is via the Alito-Kavanaugh exten-
sional approach that frames the interpretive question in empirical-public-
meaning terms.335 Thus, the question to be answered is always something
like: How would the terms of the law have been understood and applied by
ordinary people at the time of enactment?336 But the date for ascertaining the
relevant normative commitments is itself a normative question. Title VII has
been repeatedly amended: it was not even applicable to Clayton County until
the 1972 Amendments; the 1991 Amendments added section 703(m), text
material to any resolution of the LGBT employee cases.337 So should the in-
quiry have been original public meaning in 1972 or 1991? By 1991, gender
nonconformity was baked into the statute, and most Americans believed that
gay persons should not be penalized in the workplace.338 In any case, as we
addressed earlier, the Alito-Kavanaugh extensional framing of public mean-
ing is not a coherent approach to the interpretation of laws over time.339
Alternatively, normative commitments can influence the intensional
meanings of the terms in a legal provision and also the objects of interpreta-
tion. This is most easily accomplished through explicit definitions, but the
specific context of the provision also shapes the meanings of the terms. Thus,
recall that we earlier considered the possibility that within the context of Ti-
tle VII, which offers protection to employees from invidious discrimination,
only conceptions of sex that are considered by society to be ‘nondeviant’ are
covered.340 Furthermore, the sexual and gender minorities that were publicly
recognized in 1964 were “perverts,” “degenerates,” and “inverts,” illustrating
how normative views help create the perceived features of social groups.341
Even if it is accepted that ‘nondeviant’ is a feature of sex in Title VII, and de-
viancy was a feature of persons having sex with persons of the same sex in
1964, the dynamic nature of normative commitments can change the cover-
age of Title VII (as well as other statutes and constitutions). The modern so-
cial groups ‘gay men and lesbians’ and ‘transgender persons’ no longer suffer
334 . See Brief in Support of Emps., supra note 273, at 17–18.
335 . See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
336 . See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
337. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
338. Paul R. Brewer, The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay Rights, 65 J.
POL. 1208, 1213 (2003).
339 . See supra Section I.B.2.
340 . See supra notes 270–271 and accompanying text.
341 . See supra Section III.B.
May 2021] The Meaning of Sex 1573
under the stigma of ‘deviancy’ as a matter of constitutional norms, which
themselves followed and reflected social and linguistic evolution.342 As the
theory of societal dynamism illustrates, it is incorrect that a broader under-
standing of sex than existed in 1964 is required in order to protect the parties
at issue in Bostock.343 By understanding the Bostock issues through the clari-
fying lens of societal dynamism, the Court’s approach to Title VII becomes
coherent, and the dissenting opinions’ fixation on the state of things in 1964
becomes nondecisive.
CONCLUSION
Bostock has received enormous attention because it represents an ad-
vance of substantive justice for a disparaged minority. While recognizing Ti-
tle VII protections for sexual and gender minorities was overdue, the
interpretive issue was neither trivial nor novel. In an odd twist reflecting the
methodological commitments of the Court’s evolving membership, the jus-
tices authoring all three opinions in Bostock claimed to be doing nothing
more than implementing original public meaning—the interpretation most
consistent with people’s understanding of the 1964 statute. Determined to
announce an unambiguous ‘plain meaning’ baked into the law in 1964, each
justice elevated anachronism into analysis that substantially misunderstood
the social groups affected by the statute, played word games with the statuto-
ry language, and substantially ignored or marginalized judicial precedents
and congressional amendments. Bostock was a great judicial debate, but from
the perspective of rigorous legal reasoning it was something of a train wreck.
The fundamental interpretive issue we have described is quite straight-
forward. If a long-standing statute (or constitution) is applied over time to
ever-evolving social facts, political and economic contexts, and novel groups
of people, the statute will evolve beyond its original applications. All three of
the Bostock opinions stubbornly sought to closet this reality behind an in-
342. The Alito understanding of sex is also a plausible view of the constitutional assump-
tions of the America of homophobic Earl Warren—but not of the America of the gender egali-
tarian Ruth Ginsburg. The Supreme Court’s sex-discrimination jurisprudence (consistent with
Hopkins) has rejected as unconstitutional requirements that sex as biology determine gender
role, see, e .g ., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689–93 (2017) (invalidating gen-
der-based discrimination normatively acceptable when statute was enacted but inconsistent
with Court’s strong sex-equality jurisprudence), its privacy jurisprudence has rejected sex as
biology to limit one’s enjoyment of sex as sexuality to conjugal sex, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 571–76 (2003) (overruling Court’s prior allowance of laws criminalizing nonprocrea-
tive sex and rejecting arguments that such laws could be justified as preferring traditional sex-
based ‘conjugal’ relationships), and its jurisprudence of homosexuality has applied the equiva-
lent of heightened scrutiny to laws excluding sexual and gender minorities from normal gov-
ernment programs and benefits, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (declaring marriage
rights for all same-sex couples).
343 . See supra Section III.B.
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sistent ‘originalist’ methodology. Pseudohistorical and anachronistic anal-
yses do not work, and they don’t give America any clue about what is really
going on when originalists interpret super-statutes. Although not profes-
sional historians, judges can do better, and justices have the staff and re-
sources to do a lot better. If the Supreme Court’s ascendant majority wants
to shift attention away from modern language and norms and toward histor-
ical language and norms, they need to develop greater sophistication about
American social, political, and normative history. And they need to figure
out how originalism handles issues that were beyond the imagination of the
Congress that enacted a statute and the public that received it. It would also
be helpful if the originalists could figure out what to do with a statute that
changes as a result of administrative experience, binding judicial precedents,
and legislative amendments. We find it astonishing that the original-public-
meaning debate in Bostock was stuck in 1964 when the relevant statutory text
clearly was not.
If the Supreme Court’s originalists want to shift attention away from ev-
idence about the production of statutes (e.g., legislative history) to the com-
prehension of statutes (e.g., ordinary meaning), they also need to develop
greater sophistication about language and communication. To begin with,
originalists should accept, as they have in Second Amendment jurispru-
dence, that the extension of a legal text cannot be considered fixed at its time
of enactment. Instead, an intensional approach is needed: the judge deter-
mines the features of the relevant regulatory concept and then decides what
things fall within the category at the relevant point in time. In this way, the
application of a statute will change over time, even if the meaning of its
terms is held constant (via originalism). This view of the interpretive process
seems virtually incontestable with respect to the famous no-vehicles-in-the-
park hypothetical; any reasonable judge ought to agree with us that Segways,
car-like wheelchairs, and other modern vehicles are not excluded from a
1964 law simply because they emerged in society decades after the statute
was enacted. Rather, people expect that a court will apply the meaning of ve-
hicle in light of changed circumstances, even if choosing to fix its intensional
meaning as of 1964. Our core insight, that public statutes are designed to be
effective over time, not obsolete and anachronistic, is just as applicable to
super-statutes like Title VII.
Additionally, it has now become a professional embarrassment for judg-
es to pretend that public meaning (original or not) can be revealed by sim-
plistic dictionary shopping. Dictionaries can provide excellent clues, but
anyone serious about this methodology should be equally serious about the
nuances and realities of language. Justice Gorsuch is right to say that the au-
thoritative text says more than its authors intended,344 but Justice Kavanaugh
is right to say that you cannot just define each of the words and put them to-
344. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020).
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gether, as Gorsuch did.345 You need to understand the words in the context
of phrases, sentences, and even society, as Justice Alito insisted.346 But words
and language, like the societies in which they are embedded, evolve over
time—and judges who don’t understand that will fall into linguistic anach-
ronism and grammatical confusion.
Finally, normative commitments inform both the meanings of words
and the objects of interpretation—and therefore statutory coverage over
time. Justice Alito was descriptively wrong to say that sex meant only biology
in 1964, but he was arguably onto something prescriptively: sex as biology
(and the specific view that everyone was either a man or a woman) drove
people’s understanding of sex as gender and sex as sexuality. Should the na-
tion remain tethered to a normative assumption that society now rejects?
One that is now unconstitutional? An originalist theory that can justify the
Bostock dissents along these lines is objectionable for the same basic reason
Dred Scott is objectionable (though the earlier decision is uniquely reprehen-
sible): it entrenches a historical norm the country now rejects and creates so-
cial turmoil that undermines the Supreme Court’s own legitimacy. Even as a
matter of a conservative understanding of doctrine, the normative assump-
tions of the Bostock dissenters got it wrong, because they were at odds with
the Court’s own precedents and with Congress’s amendments to Title VII.
The new statutory language added in 1972 reflected the norms undergirding
Martin Marietta, the statutory language added in 1991 reflected the norms
undergirding Hopkins, and Oncale confirmed the new regime—a regime re-
flected in Justice Gorsuch’s Bob-and-Hannah hypothetical.
Language is exciting; history is fascinating. Those disciplines have much
to offer legal interpretation by judges, and we implore jurists to engage with
their critics. We hope we have deepened and not just criticized the remarka-
ble original-public-meaning debate in Bostock.
345 . Id . at 1826–27 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
346 . Id . at 1771–72 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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APPENDIX A—COLLOCATES
Much of previous legal corpus linguistics work over the last few years
has approached the notion of ordinary, or prototypical, meaning of a word
W on the basis of the following indices:
• frequency of a sense of W as determined from a concordance display
of the uses of W in their original context;
• the frequency distribution of W’s collocates (i.e., the words that occur
in a user-defined window—of often 4 or 5 words—around W in the
corpus).
For example, Lee and Mouritsen discuss the no-vehicles-in-the-park hy-
pothetical on the basis of, among other things, the 50 most frequent collo-
cates of vehicle in the News-on-the-Web (NOW) corpus.347 With regard to
the question of whether an airplane is a vehicle, they observe that “[a]irplane
does not appear, though two particular types of aircraft are attested”;348 they
then proceed with more such top-50 collocate lists (e.g., for the data repre-
senting the 1950s and the 1910s–1930s in the Corpus of Historical American
English (COHA)).349 However, as has been argued in detail by Gries,350 anal-
yses of collocates conducted like this alone are risky.
First, it seems as if their collocates are just the most common collocates,
meaning their decision on what collocates to include or discuss in the first
place is based solely on co-occurrence frequency. This is a remarkable short-
coming because, first, most corpus linguists use not only frequency but, min-
imally, also association measures for such purposes (if not also
dispersion);351 and, second, because the corpus interface they used actually
provides one such association measure (namely Mutual Information
(MI)).352 This is problematic because, as in fact their own data show, it is not
like the two measures—frequency and association/MI—measure the same
thing anyway: a linear correlation between frequency and MI in their own
100 collocates of vehicle is very low (R2 = 0 .036), indicating that the two
measures are not reflecting the same thing, meaning choosing to work with
only one is suboptimal.353 This is why all our collocate-based analyses in-
347. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 837–40.
348. Id . at 838.
349. Id . at 839.
350. Gries, supra note 129 (manuscript at 19); Slocum & Gries, supra note 135, at 29.
351. See Stefan Th. Gries, 15 Years of Collostructions: Some Long Overdue Addi-
tions/Corrections (to/of Actually All Sorts of Corpus-Linguistics Measures), 24 INT’L J. CORPUS
LINGUISTICS 385, 386–88 (2019).
352. See, e .g ., Stefan Th. Gries & Anatol Stefanowitsch, Extending Collostructional Analy-
sis: A Corpus-Based Perspective on ‘Alternations,’ 9 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 97, 101 (2004).
353. Slocum & Gries, supra note 135, at 26.
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volved computing co-occurring frequencies as well as a measure called log-
likelihood / G2, but normalized for co-occurrence frequency.
Second, even if a word W (like airplane) is frequent around a node word
of interest (like vehicle) and associated with it, that does still not mean one
can infer the exact nature of W’s semantic relation to the node word (with-
out circularly using one’s prior knowledge of W). More specifically, it is not
obvious what to infer from the presence or absence of certain collocates. For
example, their collocates of vehicle in the contemporary NOW corpus in-
clude a variety of straightforward automobile terms (e.g., motor, car, traffic,
fuel), from which they conclude that (proto)typical vehicles have motors
and, together with the other collocates, vehicles are typically cars.354 But for
two reasons, it’s not that simple. On the one hand, things can be absolutely
integral to prototypical vehicles or cars yet not be a frequent collocate: For
instance, the words wheel(s) or tires are not among the collocates Lee and
Mouritsen list,355 although the vast majority of vehicles have them,356 and
probably just about all cars have them.
On the other hand, a collocate can also often occur with a node word
precisely because the node word on its own would not imply the collocate in
a straightforward way: The reason electric is so frequently used around vehi-
cle in their data357 is precisely that the prototypical vehicle is still a car with
an internal-combustion engine, not an electric motor, so if one means to re-
fer to an electric vehicle, one has to add electric. In the same vein, note that
one of the strongest collocates of vegetarian is meat. In other words, electric
is a frequent collocate of vehicle precisely because prototypical vehicles are
not (yet) electric.
In sum, relying on collocation—co-occurrence—information on its own
is risky. Words can co-occur for many semantic relations—targeted ones or
others—and neither the presence nor the absence of a collocate around a
node word is an unambiguous diagnostic for a meaning component of a
node word; if anything, collocates can, but need not, highlight semantic di-
mension(s) relevant to a term, but not necessarily also the value of a word on
that dimension.
Finally, simple collocates can be misleading if one does not address the
effect of other, functionally similar words. For instance, one often needs
354. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 837–40.
355. Id .
356. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s definition, not all vehicles have wheels—at least not in
the sense that it is the wheels’ direct contact with the ground that creates propulsion—unless
he would want to claim that tanks, defined as “enclosed heavily armed and armored combat
vehicle[s] that move[] on tracks,” Tank, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/tank [https://perma.cc/2BZ9-SY5B], or snowmobiles, defined as “any
of various automotive vehicles for travel on snow,” Snowmobile, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/snowmobile [https://perma.cc/2AVT-XN4Y],
are not vehicles.
357. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 25, at 837.
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what Gries refers to as ‘distinctive collocates.’358 For example, in a case like
the present where it is critical to be able to determine to what degree a word
such as homosexual has negative connotations, it helps to not just compute
homosexual’s collocates, but account for the fact that some of the negative
collocates one finds among those (e.g., perversion) are actually also collocates
of sexual. That means, one has to be careful with regard to what one attrib-
utes a certain negative connotation to—how much of homosexual’s negative
connotations are also (to a certain degree) also due to sex or sexual’s negative
connotations. In sum, the allure of a sorted-collocate display notwithstand-
ing, for complex cases many more considerations need to come into play.
358. See Stefan Th. Gries, Testing the Sub-Test: An Analysis of English -ic and -ical Adjec-
tives, 8 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 31 (2003); Kenneth Ward Church, William Gale, Patrick
Hanks, Donald Hindle & Rosamund Moon, Lexical Substitutability, in COMPUTATIONAL
APPROACHES TO THE LEXICON 153 (B.T.S. Atkins & A. Zampolli eds., 1994).
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APPENDIX B—DISPERSION
Most of legal corpus linguistics, much like most of corpus linguistics in
general, has based most of its arguments on frequency information, specifi-
cally (1) the frequency of occurrence of certain words, of words in certain
contexts, or of one or more senses of words, and (2) frequency of co-
occurrence of words with other words or words with a specific sense of a
word. In particular, and now focusing on legal corpus linguistics, ordinari-
ness of meaning is regularly operationalized via commonness, or ‘wide-
spreadedness’ of use, which in turn is operationalized via frequency of
occurrence; recall our discussion of how Lee and Mouritsen utilize only co-
occurrence frequency of collocates, but not also association measures.359
While this kind of approach is widely used in (legal) corpus linguistics,
there is a growing body of research indicating that there is a corpus statis-
tic—dispersion—that could either replace frequency as a diagnostic of com-
monness or, better, that could augment frequency (in a way similar to how
both frequency and association should be considered for collocations). The
reason why dispersion should be used in tandem with frequency is two-fold.
First, on a theoretical or methodological level, words can have identical cor-
pus frequencies yet vary significantly in their dispersion.360 For example, the
words staining and enormous have the exact same frequency (37) in the
Brown corpus of written American English (which consists of one million
words in 500 corpus parts of approximately 2,000 words), but all instances of
staining occur in a single one of the 500 files whereas the 37 instances of
enormous are spread out over 36 of the 500 files.361 Any corpus analysis that
relies only on frequency and does not consider dispersion can fall prey to
such distributional facts. The second reason to use dispersion and frequency
together is that dispersion has by now been shown to be more correlated
with psycholinguistic indicators of commonness.362 But until approximately
12 years ago, too little was known about dispersion and its effects, and the
computation of dispersion measures can be computationally quite demand-
ing (computing the dispersions of all words in a corpus can, depending on
the measure used and the size of the data, require many hours to complete,
359. See supra notes 122–131 and accompanying text.
360. See supra Figure 1.
361. See Andrew Hardie, CQPweb—Combining Power, Flexibility and Usability in a Cor-
pus Analysis Tool, 17 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 380 (2012); W.N. Francis & H. Kučera,
Brown Corpus Manual, INT’L COMPUT. ARCHIVE MOD. & MEDIEVAL ENG. (last updated Sep.
11, 1997), http://icame.uib.no/brown/bcm.html [https://perma.cc/DKE6-UQL5].
362. See James S. Adelman, Gordon D.A. Brown & José F. Quesada, Contextual Diversity,
Not Word Frequency, Determines Word-Naming and Lexical Decision Times, 17 PSYCH. SCI.
814 (2006); R.H. Baayen, Demythologizing the Word Frequency Effect: A Discriminative Learn-
ing Perspective, 5 MENTAL LEXICON 436 (2010); Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted
Frequencies in Corpora: Further Explorations, in CORPUS-LINGUISTIC APPLICATIONS: CURRENT
STUDIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, 197 (Stefan Th. Gries, Stefanie Wulff & Mark Davies eds., 2010).
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even on clusters of computers). The measure of dispersion we are using here
is called DP (Deviation of Proportions) and was first proposed by Gries in
2008.363 It ranges from 0 for words that are extremely widely and evenly dis-
tributed throughout the corpus (try to find an English corpus file that does
not contain the, a, of, etc.) to 1 for words that are unevenly distributed (like
the above of staining occurring in only 1/500th of the Brown corpus).
363. Stefan Th. Gries, Dispersions and Adjusted Frequencies in Corpora, 13 INT’L J.
CORPUS LINGUISTICS 403 (2008); Jefrey Lijffijt & Stefan Th. Gries, Correction to Stefan Th .
Gries’ Dispersions and Adjusted Frequencies in Corpora,17 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 147
(2012); see also Gries, supra note 351.
